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Abstract
This thesis explores macroeconomic issues broadly relating to monetary policy.
The ﬁrst chapter studies how the monetary authority should respond to shocks
when labour productivity depends on past levels of employment (learning by do-
ing). In this context, the appropriate inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ is between inﬂation
today and the present value of deviations in the output gap. I ﬁnd that learn-
ing induces an increase in the importance of the output gap under a cost-push
shock for the (more realistic case) of a distorted steady state. The welfare costs of
business cycles are shown to be signiﬁcantly larger even under the optimal policy.
The second chapter introduces noisy news shocks into a model of exchange
rate determination to study the importance of these shocks in explaining deviations
from uncovered interest parity (UIP). Agents in the foreign exchange market make
decisions with imperfect information about economic fundamentals driving interest
rate diﬀerences across currencies in that they must rely on a noisy signal of future
interest rates. Results show that noise shocks are roughly twice as important as
news shocks in explaining UIP deviations, with the impact of noise shocks being
more pronounced during periods of changing monetary policy.
The third chapter develops a new index of economic uncertainty for South
Africa for the period 1990-2014 and analyses the macroeconomic impact of changes
in this measure. The index is constructed from three sources: (1) forecaster dis-
agreement, (2) a count of international and local newspaper articles discussing
economic uncertainty in South Africa and (3) mentions of uncertainty in the quar-
terly economic review of the South African Reserve Bank. The uncertainty index
is a leading indicator of a recession. An unanticipated increase in the index is as-
sociated with a fall in GDP, investment, industrial production and private sector
employment. Contrary to evidence for the U.S.A and U.K., uncertainty shocks
are inﬂationary. These results are robust to controlling for consumer conﬁdence,
a corporate credit spread proxy as well as global risk shocks (VIX index).
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Chapter 1
Monetary policy and endogenous
productivity
Abstract
I study the implications of learning by doing in production for optimal monetary
policy using a basic New Keynesian model. Learning-by-doing is modeled as a stock of
skills that accumulates based on past employment. The presence of this learning-by-doing
externality breaks the 'divine coincidence' result that by stabilising inﬂation the output
gap will automatically be closed, for a variety of shocks that are important in explaining
the buseiness cycle. In this context, the appropriate inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ is between
inﬂation today and the present value of deviations in the output gap. Optimal policy is
approached as a Ramsey problem permitting a study of variations in key parameters and
steadystates which is uncommon in a literature that relies on a quadratic approximation
to the utility function. Exploiting this variation I ﬁnd that learning induces an increase in
the importance of the output gap under a cost-push shock for the (more realistic case) of
a distorted steadystate. The welfare costs of business cycles are shown to be signiﬁcantly
larger even under the optimal policy.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, J24, E31.
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Labor Productivity, Inﬂation.
1.1 Introduction
What is the role of output in monetary policy? The Basic New Keynesian model
(BNKM), that is a real business cycle model augmented only with nominal fric-
tions, does not imply any role for managing output with monetary policy. Rather,
optimal monetary policy is strict inﬂation targeting. This is because eliminating
inﬂation entails that output behaves as it does in a ﬂexible price world and absent
any real rigidities or market imperfections the ﬂexible price level of output is po-
tential output, meaning the output gap is zero. It is as if by divine coincidence
(Blanchard and Gali (2005)) that by only caring about inﬂation the policy maker
can avoid welfare losses emanating from changes in the real economy.
To induce a meaningful trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation some non-trivial
real imperfection is needed. New Keynesian models used in policy analysis, e.g.
(Smets and Wouters (2003)), include real imperfections such as nominal wage
rigidities (Erceg et al. (2000)) and/or consumption habits (Leith et al. (2012)) to
augment the BNKM. In this paper, I study the implications for optimal monetary
policy of an alternative imperfection, a learning-by-doing (LBD) externality, in an
otherwise standard Basic New Keynesian model.
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Learning-by-doing externalities have been widely studied in the literature on
economic growth. However, there is a growing literature documenting their rele-
vance to the business cycle, indicating that they induce more realistic dynamics
in both a closed and open economy setting 1. Learning-by-doing creates a link be-
tween the levels of production or employment in the economy today and its ability
to produce tomorrow. The productivity of the economy tomorrow aﬀects marginal
costs and thus inﬂation tomorrow. Thus it is plausible that such a mechanism may
have policy implicaitons for the trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation.
In this paper I model LBD following Chang et al. (2002), whereby the produc-
tivity of workers depends on both an exogenous technology as well as an endoge-
nous economy-wide stock of skills of the workforce2. These skills depend on the
past levels of employment capturing the notion that workers skills may depreciate
during periods of low employment.
The LBD externality acts through two channels. The ﬁrst is a marginal cost
channel, whereby lower output and employment today entail lower skill levels
in the future. With lower skill levels, worker productivity falls raising marginal
costs and inﬂation. If the policy maker wants to neutralise the eﬀect of a shock
on marginal costs today by engineering a drop in output that fully absorbs the
impact then she must accept that future marginal costs will rise. Since inﬂation
is nothing but expected discounted marginal costs this induces higher inﬂation
today. In this way LBD induces a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output today
and so breaks the divine coincidence 3. In the BNKM, marginal costs depend
only on current output implying that letting output fully absorb the eﬀects of a
shock in order to neutralise deviations in marginal costs does not have additional
inﬂationary eﬀects through higher future marginal costs.
The second channel is the direct impact of skills on the utility of the household.
Higher levels of skills mean that households need to work fewer hours to produce
a unit of output. Lower output today means households have to work more in
the future due to lower productivity to produce a given unit of output. The
policy maker that reduces output to stabilise marginal costs today must consider
that the household will have to work harder in the future creating an additional
1In a closed economy setting, Chang et al. (2002) show improved persistence in an RBC model
following exogenous technology shocks, Tsuruga (2007a) documents hump-shaped responses in
output to a monetary policy shock while d'Alessandro (2015) has shown that consumption rises
following a positive shock to government spending when LBD is present but this is counter-
factually negative without it in a BNKM. In an open economy setting, Johri and Lahiri (2008)
show that LBD at the ﬁrm level implies greater persistence in real exchange rates and Benigno
and Fornaro (2012) have shown that LBD in the import sector can rationalise large build-ups of
foreign exchange reserves.
2 For tractability, these skills are a property of a representative household that makes a labour
supply decision and thus skills do not vary across workers or ﬁrms.
3An exception is a technology shock when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1
(σ = 1) as discussed in section 4.
11
1.1. Introduction
cost to reducing output in order to stablise inﬂation.The optimal policy considers
the impact of both these channels when deciding the appropriate inﬂation-output
trade-oﬀ today.
I approach the monetary policy problem as a Ramsey problem following Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2005) and Woodford (2010). This apporach is consistent with
the more popular method of deriving a purely quadratic approxmiation4 to the
households utility function and then combining this with the ﬁrst order approx-
imation to the model's equilibrium equations to solve a linear-quadratic control
problem (see for example, Gali (2008)). The linear-quadratic approach is insight-
ful as it allows a simple expression of the dependence of welfare on parameters of
the model. However, it is not always simple or feasible to derive a second order
approximation to utiltiy5 and it may restrict the feasibility of studying parameter
variation, for example (Gali and Monacelli (2005); Wren-Lewis and Leith (2007))
restrict the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to be unity to be able to study
the linear-quadratic solution in an open economy environment. Moreover, it is
common to make those approximations to the model around a steady state where
the eﬀects of all distrotions have been removed (the eﬃcient steady state). This
eﬃcient steady state is achieved via a subsidy that, for exmaple induces ﬁrms to
produce the pareto optimal level of output, thus neutralising the distortionary
eﬀects of monopolistic competition on steady state output. In its favour, this con-
vention avoids conﬂating issues relating to long run economic growth with policies
concerned with stabilising the business cycle6, however, approximating the model
around the steady state where frictions are present (the distorted steady state)
can yield policy relevant insights7. The quadratic approximation approach is ill
suited to this purpose as it requires tedious derivations of the model equations to
second order to study the behaviour of policy away from the eﬃcient steady state
(Benigno and Woodford (2005)). This is relevant, as intorducing LBD leads to
large deviations of output from its eﬃcient steady state value in the absence of
the appropriate subsidy.
Using this framework I study 4 shocks in both the eﬀcient and distorted steady
4There can be no ﬁrst order terms in the approximation to have a solution to the linear-
quadratic problem that is accurate to second order - see Woodford (2003), Chapter 6.
5I found this approach infeasible in the context of LBD. In particular it was not possible to
replace all linear terms from the objective function via second order approximations to the model
equations due to the presence of the law of motion for the stock of endogenous skills.
6 The classic inﬂationary-bias result of Barro and Gordon (1983) is a study where inﬂation
results from the policy maker trying to raise output above its steady state level, as if to raise
long run growth.
7 DePaoli (2009), exploring parameter variation in an open economy New Keynesian model
with a distorted steadystate, has found conditions under which exchange rate stabilisation should
be part of the goals of monetary policy.
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state: three shocks where the divine coincidence holds in the Basic New Keynesian
Model (BNKM), labour supply, technology and demand or preference shock; and
a cost-push shock which creates an inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ even in the BNKM. I
ﬁnd that the LBD externality implies that the ﬂexible price allocation is no longer
optimal, breaking the divine coincidence result. The ability to costlessly achieve
zero inﬂation depends on how marginal costs move with output and the shocks
hitting the economy. In the BNKM, ﬁrms' marginal costs are determined within-
period by the output level relative to technology, the preferences of households to
consume and supply labour. Having output adjust to oﬀset these changes entails
that marginal costs do not deviate from steady state under these shocks. Since
inﬂation is nothing but the present value of expected deviations in marginal costs
in these models inﬂation is zero in every period. In a ﬂexible price world output
responds in exactly this way. I show that the LBD externality implies an additional
forward looking component to policy decisions, considering the impact tomorrow
of todays choices on output (beyond inﬂation expectations). This is sumarised
in an inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ where the costs of inﬂation today are weighted
against the present value of future output gaps. This entails a smoothing motive
for the policy maker which depends on how households value current versus future
consumption (the elasticity of intertemporal substitution).
I show that LBD introduces a greater role for stabilising the output gap. Under
contractionary demand and labour supply shocks optimal policy calls for a decline
in the interest rate whereas a rise would be optimal without LBD. This is to reduce
both the inﬂationary consequences of a decline in skills as well as the rise in the
disutility of labour such a skills drop entails. A similar result obtains for cost-push
shocks but only in the distorted steady state. Diminishing returns to labour induce
lower levels of steady state output. Learning ampliﬁes this steady state eﬀect by
further reducing the productivity of workers when output is low. As shown in
section 3.2.1, these eﬀects are large relative to the case without learning. The
larger is the gap between eﬃcient and steady state output the greater the weight
the policy maker must give to the impact of changes in output on marginal costs of
ﬁrms operating in the ineﬃcient steady state. This is due to an interaction between
time-consistent policy choices and the size of distortions in the steady state. A
time-consistent policy maker must place a positive weight on the marginal cost
and revenue conditions that ﬁrms face in the distorted steady state but the size
of these distortions are signiﬁcantly larger in the presence of LBD than without.
These eﬀects are not present in the eﬃcient steady state since by assumption the
appropriate production subsidy ensures ﬁrms produce the maximal level of steady
state output. The welfare costs of shocks increase by up to twice the levels seen
in the BNKM depending on the shock. This is due to additional costs from a
non-trivial policy trade-oﬀ and, mechanically, from the endogenous propogation
of shocks through LBD.
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This paper is related to the literature on optimal monetary policy address-
ing the divine coincidence, studies of monetary policy decisions in the distorted
steady state and attempts to merge endogenous growth theories with business
cycles. Blanchard and Gali (2005) originally noted the problem of the divine co-
incidence and introduced rigid real wages as a means of creating a wedge between
the ﬂexible price level of output and the eﬃcient level of output. A similar ap-
proach that applies the Calvo (1983) mechanism, developed by Erceg et al. (2000),
to induce wage rigidity has become widespread in medium scale macro models such
as Smets and Wouters (2003). Consumption habits are another addition to the
core New Keynesian model popular in medium scale models that introduces a
real imperfection capable of breaking the divine coincidence (Leith et al. (2012)).
The present study is similar in spirit to Leith et al. (2012), however I study the
implications of alternative dynamic externality on optimal policy.
The analysis of the optimal policy in New Keynesain models rarely includes
a study of the case of the distorted steady state. Either, these distortions are
assumed to be small enough so that they would not materially alter policy mak-
ers response to shocks (Gali (2008); Woodford (2010)) or a production subsidy
capable of supporting the eﬃcient level of steady state output is assumed. Stud-
ies that have attempted to analyse monetary policy with steady state distortions
have yielded important insights: The classic inﬂationary-bias result of Barro and
Gordon (1983) is such a study and DePaoli (2009), exploring parameter variation
in an open economy New Keynesian model with a distorted steadystate, has found
the conditions under which exchange rate stability should be part of the goals of
monetary policy. Similarly, Benigno and Benigno (2008) have shown under which
shocks and steady states there are gains from cooperation in monetary policy be-
tween countries. Production subsidies are relatively rare in practice and a real
imperfection can lead to large steady state distortions requiring implausibly high
subsidies8.
Learning-by-doing externalities have been studied extensively in the growth
literature (e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1993)) and there is evidence that skills
depreciation is an important cost of low levels of employment (Altug and Miller
(1998); Sparber (2011); Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2009)). However, the cyclical
implications are less well understood. Studies of the cyclical implications of LBD
are largely positive exercises in matching empirical regularities in the business
cycle data. Chang et al. (2002) developed the reduced form LBD mechanism em-
ployed here where they showed that this mechanism delivers improved persistence
8For context these are 10% in the BNKM when the elasticity of substitution between varieties
of goods is 11 rising to 29% with moderate learning and 46% when learning is strong (these
qualitative descriptions of the strength of learning are made concrete in Section 4 below). Clearly
the imperfection of LBD introduces makes the supposition of production subsidies of this scale
more implausible and helps to motivate a check of the results in the case where the subsidy is
zero.
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in a real business cycle model based on Bayesian estimation on U.S. data .Tsu-
ruga (2007b) employed a similar mechanism to capture the hump-shaped response
of output to a monetary policy shock. Recently, d'Alessandro (2015) has shown
that this mechanism can generate a positive comovement between consumption
and government spending in a New Keynesian Model. LBD has been fruitfully
employed in an open economy setting. Johri and Lahiri (2008) have shown that
learning at the ﬁrm level can help produce the persistence of real exchange rates
found in the data. Benigno and Fornaro (2012) have shown that learning by do-
ing generated by importing intermediate goods can help to explain the signiﬁcant
reserve accumulation seen in developing Asian countries in the last decade. The
latter authors also analyse the normative implications of their learning mecha-
nism showing that such reserve accumulation is optimal from the prespective of
the accumulating country. The current work is more closely related to Benigno
and Fornaro (2015) who introduce nominal frictions into an endogenous growth
model where investment levels inﬂuence productivity. They ﬁnd that this mecha-
nism creates a very stong feedback between output and expectations of ﬁrm proﬁts
leading to multiple equilibria. Thus they focus on a steady state analysis show-
ing that the level of the subsidies provided to entrepreneurs is key in avoiding a
liquidity trap. The current paper also highlights the role of eﬃcient subsidies and
illustrates how they are much more potent in an environemnt with endogenous
productivity than without. Both Benigno and Fornaro (2015) and the current
paper capture, in an optimising frameowrk, Summers (2015) inverse Say's law, a
channel through which a lack of demand can inﬂuence potential output. As shown
in section 3.3, potential output and the output gap is dependent on the stock of
skills in the economy and this then implies that the natural rate of interest is a
function of the stock of skills. Shocks leading to lower output can then imply a
decline in the natural rate of interest, when no such decline would occur without
LBD. Indeed, with negative demand and labour supply shocks, calibrated as in
Smets and Wouters (2003), I ﬁnd declines in the natural rate of interest rather
than the increase seen without LBD. Thus this mechanism is relevant to the sec-
ular stagnation debate explaining the protratced decline in potential output after
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a
New Keynesian model with learning-by-doing and highlights the channels through
which learning aﬀects ﬁrms costs and houshold's utility. Section 3 discussed the
Ramsey optimal policy problem and presents the implications of learning for the
steady state output and the welfare-relevant output gap. Section 4 discusses the
quatitative results of the optimal monetary policy. Section 5 presents the size
welfare losses induced by the externality. Section 6 presents results on the optimal
inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ when the policy maker follows a Taylor rule. Section 7
concludes.
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1.2 Model
The model presented here follows the canonical New Keynesian model of Woodford
(2010) where learning-by-doing in production in the spirit of Chang et al. (2002)
is introduced.
1.2.1 Households
The economy is cashless (Woodford (2003)) and populated by identical inﬁnitely-
lived households who choose their consumption, labour supply and holdings of
nominal bonds to solve:
max
{Ct,Ht,Bt}∞t=t0
Ut0 = E0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{
u(Ct; ξ
C
t )− v(Ht; ξHt )
}
(1.1)
= E0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
C
1− 1
σ
t
(
ξCt
) 1
σ
1− 1σ
− H
1+ 1
ψ
t
(
ξHt
) 1
ψ
1 + 1ψ

s.t. PtCt +Qt,t+1Bt ≤ Bt−1 +WtHt + Υt + Tt
Ct is an index of aggregate consumption, Ht is hours of labour supplied, Wt
is the nominal wage, Tt are net government transfers, Υt are proﬁts from ﬁrms;
and ξCt and ξ
H
t are shocks to preferences for consumption and labour supply re-
spectively. Households have access to complete asset markets where they can
trade one-period bonds, Bt, at a price Qt,t+1. Aggregate consumption, Ct, and
the price level, Pt, are deﬁned with the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators over individual
consumption good varieties, Ct(i), and their prices, Pt(i) :
Ct =
 1ˆ
0
Ct(i)
−1
 di


−1
Pt =
 1ˆ
0
Pt(i)
1−di

1
1−
(1.2)
Where  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods. The solu-
tion to the households problem, (1.1), entails the following intra-temporal labour
supply condition and bond price:
Wt
Pt
=
vh
uc
=
(
Ct
ξCt
) 1
σ
(
Ht
ξHt
) 1
ψ
(1.3)
Qt,t+1 = β
uC(Ct+1, ξ
C
t+1)
uC(Ct, ξCt )
Pt
Pt+1
= β
(
Yt
Yt+1
ξCt+1
ξCt
) 1
σ Pt
Pt+1
(1.4)
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Where the last equality follows from imposing the market clearing which re-
quires that Yt = Ct.
1.2.2 Firms
1.2.2.1 Production
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms where each variety
of good, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], is supplied by a single producer. The ith ﬁrms
buys labour hours, N(i), from households on a competitive labour market. The
productivity of workers depends on the aggregate level of exogenous technology,
At, as well as the level of endogenous aggregate worker skills, Xt, that alters the
eﬀective unit of labour supplied by households. Firms face diminishing returns to
production, governed by α, in employing this eﬀective unit of labour:
Yt(i) = At(XtNt(i))
1−α (1.5)
The aggregate stock of workers' skills Xt evolves depending on past levels of
employment, a form of learning-by-doing, as in Chang et al. (2002)9:
Xt = X
φx
t−1N
µ
t−1 (1.6)
I will follow Chang et al. (2002) in that this learning is external to ﬁrms,
that is, they do not internalise the eﬀects of employment on productivity of their
workers10. In the current context this can be motivated by the fact that worker
productivity depends on the economy-wide level of skills and each producer's em-
ployment decision, Nt(i), contributes only inﬁnitesimally to the aggregate stock
of skills, Xt.
Each producer faces a downward sloping demand curve for their variety of
goods based on the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences described above:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Yt (1.7)
Yt is the aggregate demand for the consumption basket Ct deﬁned in (1.2).
Producers are subject to Calvo (1983) price rigidities which implies that Pt(i)
need not equal the aggregate price level Pt as only a subset of ﬁrms are able to
9This nests the BNKM analysed in Woodford (2010) when µ→ 0
10If a single producer or a few large producers supplied output and internalised the impact of
employment levels today on their future marginal costs then the labour demand would no longer
be static as here, but would instead include a dynamic term similar to the second term on the
RHS of the planners ﬁrst order condition (1.31) given below in section 3.1. This is not considered
since it would mean the externality poses no policy problem for the monetary policy maker to
counteract.
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reset prices each period giving rise to a measure of cross-sectional price dispersion:
∆t ≡
1ˆ
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−(1+η)
di ≥ 1 (1.8)
Where η = α1−α . Using (1.5) and (1.7), this now allows us to relate the level of
skills to the past levels of output and the dispersion of prices:
Nt(i) =
(
Yt(i)
At
)1+η 1
Xt
(1.9)
Nt ≡
ˆ 1
0
Nt(i)di =
(
1
At
)1+η 1
Xt
ˆ 1
0
Yt(i)
(1+η)di =
(
Yt
At
)1+η ∆t
Xt
(1.10)
(1.10) indicates that for a given level of output, Yt, improved technology or
skills requires fewer workers whereas greater price dispersion acts to reduce labour
productivity. Why? Consumers want to consume an equal amount of each variety
of goods produced by the diﬀerent ﬁrms (since Dixit-Stiglitz preferences entail
that each these diﬀerentiated goods have an equal weight in the consumption
basket). Thus the demand for aggregate output falls when this output exhibits a
greater price dispersion across varieties of goods. Even if technology and skills are
unchanged, dispersed output levels will aggregate up to a lower Yt11.
Thus (lagged) price dispersion in aﬀecting the level of aggregate output, aﬀects
the demand for labour and thus employment altering the evolution of skills:
Xt = X
φx−µ
t−1
(
Yt−1
At−1
)µ(1+η)
∆µt−1 (1.11)
Here we can see that higher output raises skill levels but so does price disper-
sion. This is due to the requirement for more labour to produce a given level of
output when prices are dispersed.
1.2.2.2 Price setting
Producers are subject to Calvo (1983) price rigidities whereby they face a ﬁxed
probability, ω, of being able to reset their price each period. Thus each ﬁrm takes
into account that the price chosen today, t, has a probability of survival of ωT−t,
after T periods have passed. Thus a ﬁrm able to reset their price at time t will
solve the following problem:
11This is not simply a feature of Calvo pricing. Rotemberg pricing implies the same so long
as the price level today is not identical to the price level last period, that is, it will matter in
the presence of shocks. There is no eﬀect of price dispersion or price adjustment costs on labour
productivity in the steady state.
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max
{Pt(i)}∞t=t0
Et
∞∑
T=t
ωT−tQt,TΠ(Pt(i), PT , YT , XT ; ξT ) (1.12)
ξT refers to the entire collection of shocks that aﬀect ﬁrms pricing decision,
ξ′T =
[
AT ξ
C
T ξ
H
T µ
P
T
]
. µPT refers to a shock to ﬁrms desired steady state
mark-up, −1 and AT refers to the level of exogenous technology. Qt,T is the value
placed on nominal proﬁts returned to the household T periods hence (see equation
(1.4)). For the ith ﬁrm nominal proﬁts in period T are simply nominal revenues
less costs:
(1− τ)Pt(i)
(
Pt(i)
PT
)−
YT −WTNT (i) (1.13)
Nominal revenue is (1 − τ)Pt(i)Yt(i) where I have used (1.7) and τ is a pro-
duction tax or subsidy levied by the government. In order to see how (1.13) can
be written as a function of Pt(i), PT , YT , XT , ξT only, as in (1.12), I make use of
(1.3) and (1.10) to decompose the nominal cost term WTNT (i). Applying the in-
tratemporal optimality condition of households, (1.3), nominal wages must equal
the price level times the marginal rate of substitution:
WT = PT
(
CT
ξCT
) 1
σ
(
NT
ξHT
) 1
ψ
(1.14)
Market clearing in this closed economy requires that Yt = Ct and
´ 1
0 Nt(i)di =
Nt = Ht. Using the latter and (1.3) and (1.10), the nominal wage becomes:
WT = PT
(
YT
ξCT
) 1
σ
(
1
ξHT
) 1
ψ
(
YT
AT
) 1+η
ψ
(
∆T
XT
) 1
ψ
(1.15)
The required number of employees, NT (i):
NT (i) =
(
YT (i)
AT
)1+η 1
XT
=
(
YT
AT
)1+η 1
XT
(
Pt(i)
PT
)−(1+η)
(1.16)
Thus Qt,TΠ(Pt(i), PT , YT , XT ; ξT ) in (1.12) can be written as a function of
Pt(i), PT , YT , XT , ξT only. The ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximisation is:
Et
∞∑
T=t
ωT−tQt,TΠ1(Pt(i), PT ;YT , ξT ) = 0 (1.17)
All ﬁrms able to reset their price will make the same choice (as they are iden-
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tical) thus Pt(i) = P ∗t . Given the assumptions made above a convenient closed
form relationship characterising aggregate supply in the economy can be derived
(see appendix):
(
P ∗t
Pt
)
=
(
Ft
Kt
) −1
1+η
(1.18)
Ft captures the expected future nominal (marginal) revenue and Kt captures
expected future nominal (marginal) costs. These functions are the key forward
looking variables in the model that lead to the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
They are deﬁned by:
Ft = Et
∞∑
T=t
(ωβ)T−tf(YT ; ξCT )
(
PT
Pt
)−1
(1.19)
Kt = Et
∞∑
T=t
(ωβ)T−tk(YT , XT ,∆T ; ξT )
(
PT
Pt
)(1+η)
(1.20)
f(YT ; ξT ) = (1− τ)Y 1−
1
σ
T
(
ξCT
) 1
σ (1.21)
k(YT , XT ,∆T ; ξT ) = µ
P
t (1 + η)
(
YT
AT
)1+χ( 1
XT
)1+ 1
ψ
(
∆T
ξHT
) 1
ψ
(1.22)
Exogenous variations in µPt will be studied as cost-push shocks below and
χ ≡ (1 + 1ψ )(1 + η) − 1. From (1.22) we can see that a higher skills will induce
lower marginal costs for ﬁrms, that is higher levels of worker skills (XT ) raises
their marginal product which in turn requires ﬁrms to hire fewer workers at the
given wage, reducing marginal costs. This formulation is very convenient in that
(1.19) and (1.20) can be written recursively, where Πt = Pt/Pt−1:
Ft = f(Yt; ξt) + ωβEtΠ
−1
t+1Ft+1 (1.23)
Kt = k(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt) + ωβEtΠ
(1+η)
t+1 Kt+1 (1.24)
The Calvo scheme entails that the price index evolves according to:
P 1−t = (1− ω) (P ∗t )1− + ωP 1−t−1 (1.25)
Which can be used in conjunction with (1.18) to yield an equation governing
the behaviour of inﬂation each period, analogous to an aggregate supply relation:
1− ωΠ−1t
1− ω =
(
Ft
Kt
) −1
1+η
(1.26)
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As noted by Woodford (2010) this description is equivalent to the New Key-
nesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) if one log-linearises (1.19),(1.20) and (1.26):
pit = κ
[
Yˆt −
(
1 + ψ−1
χ+ σ−1
)
Xˆt +
(
ψ−1
χ+ σ−1
)
∆ˆt + u
′
ξ ξ˜t
]
+ βEtpit+1 +O(||ξ2||)
(1.27)
κ =
(1− ω)(1− ωβ)(χ+ σ−1)
ω(1 + η)
; u′ξ = (χ+
1
σ
)−1
[
−(1 + χ) −σ−1 −ψ−1 1
]
ξ′t =
[
At ξ
C
t ξ
H
t µ
P
t
]
Where for each variable Zˆt ≡ lnZt− ln Z¯ and Z˜t = Zt− Z¯ and pit ≡ Πˆt. Since
the log-linearised version of the law of motion for price dispersion, see equation
(1.28) in section 2.3, is the deterministic equation∆ˆt = ω∆ˆt−1 if ∆ˆt0−1 = O(||ξ2||)
then ∆ˆt = O(||ξ2||) ∀t. Thus terms in ∆ˆt can be ignored to a ﬁrst order. If
additionally Xˆt = 0 then this is simply the standard NKPC. The channel from
higher skills to lower marginal costs and thus inﬂation is evident from (1.27). A
higher stock of skills reduces ﬁrms marginal costs and thus reduces inﬂation.
Households optimal holding of one period bonds, as described by (1.4), is linked
to the choice of the short term nominal interest rate set by the policy maker via
the no arbitrage relation on bonds, 1 + it = [EtQt]
−1. The combination of these
conditions yields the New Keynesian IS curve (when log-linearised). The ﬁnal
component required to close the model is a statement of how the interest rate will
be chosen, this is implied by the Ramsey planners choice of allocations described
below in section 3.2.
1.2.3 Price dispersion, skills and welfare
A law of motion linking cross-sectional price dispersion, ∆t, to aggregate in-
ﬂation, Πt, can be derived from (1.8) and (1.25):
∆t = ω∆t−1Π
(1+η)
t + (1− ω)
(
1− ωΠ−1t
1− ω
) (1+η)
−1
(1.28)
This link is key to explaining the welfare implications of inﬂation in New
Keynesian models. The impact of skills and price dispersion on welfare can now
be seen by imposing market clearing and substitution of (1.10) into the utility
function of the household:
Ut0 = E0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 {U(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)}
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Ut0 = E0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{
u(Yt; ξ
C
t )− v(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)
}
Ut0 = E0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
Y
1− 1
σ
t
(
ξCt
) 1
σ
1− 1σ
−
(
ξHt
)− 1
ψ
1 + 1ψ
(
Yt
At
)(1+η)(1+ 1
ψ
)(
∆t
Xt
)(1+ 1
ψ
)
(1.29)
From (1.29) we can see that the impact of both skills and price dispersion
on period utility is equal but opposite in the sense that UXtXt = −U∆t∆t.The
intuition behind this result is that greater price dispersion implies greater output
dispersion which leads to a composition of output that is less valued by households
(see discussion in section 2.2.1). To produce a given unit output, more labour
hours are required with higher is price dispersion. This eﬀect reduces utility
through the disutility of work. Higher levels of productivity, either exogenous
(At) or endogenous (Xt), directly increase the output of workers requiring fewer
hours of work to produce a given unit of output. Thus the higher is endogenous
productivity (say from high level of activity in the past), the lower is the disutility
created from producing a unit of output. The value of this channel in reducing
the negative impact of inﬂation on household welfare is evaluated by solving the
Ramsey problem for this economy.
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of allocations and
prices such that markets clear and household's utility (1.1) and ﬁrms proﬁts (1.12)
are maximised. This is summarised by {Ft,Kt,∆t,Πt, Yt, Xt}∞t=0 satisfying the
households optimality conditions (1.3) and (1.4); the law of motion for skills (1.11);
the deﬁnition of the forward looking measures of marginal costs and revenue for
ﬁrms (1.23) and (1.24); the ﬁrms ﬁrst order condition summarised in aggregate
supply relation (1.26); the law of motion for price dispersion (1.28) together with
a description for the exogenous stochastic processes ξt.
1.3 Optimal monetary policies with learning by doing
1.3.1 Social planners problem
The social planner maximises the households utility subject to the resource
constraints captured in equation (1.10) and the law of motion for skills (1.11).
However the social planner will never choose to have any price dispersion in this
economy since this requires the household to work harder12 . Thus the social
12In the BNKM the only source of welfare losss are due to higher price dispersion. However, in
the presence of LBD there may be oﬀsetting gains due to the positive eﬀect of higher skills and
thus a lower disutility of labour. In fact, however, this eﬀect is not large enough to compensate
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planner solves:
max
{Yt}∞t=t0
Ut0 = E0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{
u(Yt; ξ
C
t )− v(Yt, Xt; ξt)
}
(1.30)
s.t. Xt = X
φx−µ
t−1
(
Yt−1
At−1
)µ(1+η)
In the standard New Keynesian model the optimal rule requires that the
marginal beneﬁt of an additional unit of output is just compensated by the addi-
tional disutility of producing that output: uY,t = vY,t. In the presence of learning
this static rule becomes dynamic with the additional beneﬁt today of working
being a lower disutility of work tomorrow:
uY (Yt; ξ
C
t ) + βEt
{
−vX(Yt+1, Xt+1; ξt+1)∂Xt+1(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)
∂Yt
}
= vY (Yt, Xt; ξt)
(1.31)
Where vX < 0. This optimal rule is used to characterise the eﬃcient level
of output, Y et . This level of output will not, in general, be feasible when the
policy maker must make her choices subject to competitive equilibrium13. Optimal
choices subject to competitive equilibrium are Ramsey Policies.
1.3.2 Ramsey policies
The Ramsey policy is a choice of {Ft,Kt,∆t,Πt, Yt} for all t ≥ t0 to max-
imise (1.29) while satisfying (1.23),(1.24), the forward looking relations capturing
marginal costs and revenues for ﬁrms; (1.26), the aggregate supply relation re-
lating these forwarding looking variables to inﬂation; the law of motion for skills
(1.11); and (1.28), which links inﬂation to the welfare relevant measure of cross-
sectional price dispersion; given ∆t0−1 and Xt0−114. Xt is not an explicit choice
variable for the policy maker since the choice of Yt−1 and ∆t−1 take into account
their inﬂuence on Xt. This facilitates comparison with the literature where the
for the costs, in terms of disutility of labour, that it attracts. Higher price dispersion can
induce higher skills tomorrow (see equation (1.11)). However, to a ﬁrst order approximation,
any increase in ∆ˆt will induce an increase of µ on Xˆt+1. To a ﬁrst order, the law of motion for
∆t, around the zero inﬂation steadystate, is ∆ˆt = ω∆ˆt−1. Thus this will induce an increase in
∆t+1 of ω. Since ω > µ for all reasonable parametrisations, the social planner will never ﬁnd it
optimal to create price dispersion to increase productivity as this is always overwhelmed by the
decrease in productivity induced by more price dispersion.
13Contrasting (1.31) with (1.39) illustrates why this level of output may not be feasible: the
planner would need to take account for the forward looking behaviour of ﬁrms captured in the
Lagrange multipliers associated with ﬁrms' forward looking constraints to the Ramsey problem.
14The New Keynesian IS curve will not enter the Ramsey problem as the nominal interest
rate does not appear in the utility function of the household nor in any of the constraints to the
problem. Thus output can be thought of as chosen directly by the policy maker and the nominal
interest rate (the instrument of monetary policy) that this requires backed out of this IS relation.
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policy maker is thought of as choosing {Πt, Yt} only15. As currently described this
problem is time inconsistent. Due to the forward looking conditions (1.23)-(1.24)
policy makers know that the choices made today will have an eﬀect on expec-
tations formed in the previous period, since ﬁrms will form expectations based
on these policies, and this constrains the choices they can make. However this
constraint is not binding when t = t0 leading to time inconsistent policy choices
between the initial point t0 and periods thereafter t > t0. I adopt the solution
proposed by Woodford (2010) which he calls optimal policy from a timeless per-
spective. The policy maker undertakes precommitments, at t0 − 1, to certain
values of the forward looking variables in the next period, Kt0 and Ft0 , that are
consistent with the optimal choices in future periods. These precommitments are
captured in the values of the Lagrange multipliers (see problem statement below)
φ1,t0−1 and φ2,t0−1 which govern whether the forward looking constraints bind; or
in other words, they control the temptation to raise Πt0 above a level consistent
with the forward looking constraints. The precommitment values for Kt0 and Ft0
are the steady state values of Ft and Kt, denoted by K¯ and F¯ , for the Ramsey
problem below. The choices of K¯ and F¯ are a function of steady state output and
have been constrained to be consistent with future choices, that is choices made
under the same constraints the Ramsey planner faces in future periods (see steady
state solution in Section 3.2.1 and Appendix II for details). Thus, the Ramsey
plan from a timeless perspective requires that the Ramsey planner treat forward
looking behaviour in a way that is consistent with the initial conditions (or steady
state) of the Ramsey problem.
The Ramsey problem outlined above can be described by the Lagrangian:
max
{Ft,Kt,∆t,Πt,Yt}∞t=t0
Lt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0L(Yt, Xt, Ft,Kt,Πt,∆t; θt,φt, ξt) (1.32)
Where
L(Yt, Xt, Ft,Kt,Πt,∆t; θt,φt, ξt) = u(Yt; ξ
C
t )− v(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)+
θt
[
∆t − ω∆t−1Π(1+η)t − (1− ω)
(
1−ωΠ−1t
1−ω
) (1+η)
−1
]
15As shown in section 2.2.2 on price setting, combining the two forward looking equations
for Ft and Kt along with the aggregate supply curve (1.26) and log-linearising produces the
standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve (1.27). In a standard linear quadratic approach to
optimal monetary policy, e.g. Woodford (2003); Gali (2008), this would allow the problem to be
stated in terms of just 2 variables aggregate inﬂation, Πt, and aggregate output, , Y . Since here
I do not pursue the linear quadratic approach I use a full set of equilibrium conditions which
includes variables {Ft,Kt,∆t,Πt, Yt}. Where LBD absent this would be identical to the linear
quadratic approach typically used, as shown in Woodford (2010).
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φ1,t [Ft − f(Yt; ξt)]−ωφ1,t−1
[
Π−1t Ft
]
+φ2,t [Kt − k(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)]+ωφ2,t−1
[
Π
(1+η)
t Kt
]
+φ3,t
[
1−ωΠe−1t
1−ω −
(
Ft
Kt
) −1
1+η
]
Where φt′ =
[
φ1,t φ2,t φ3,t
]
.The multipliers φ1,t0−1, φ2,t0−1 will capture
the precommitments i.e. they will be the values consistent with the steady state
solution of the model under the same constraints the Ramsey planner faces for
t > t0 . I consider the local dynamics near the zero inﬂation steady state of the
model. The complete ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) are described in the appendix.
Here I will focus on the optimal rule for output and price dispersion since these
rules involve additional terms due to LBD. The optimal rule for the the choice of
output is:
uY (Yt; ξ
C
t )
(
1− φ1,t(1− τ)(1− σ−1)
)
+
βEt {−vX(Yt+1, Xt+1,∆t+1; ξt+1)− φ2,t+1kX(Yt+1, Xt+1,∆t+1; ξt+1)} ∂Xt+1(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)
∂Yt
=
(
1 + φ2,tµ
P
t (1− χ)(1 + ψ−1)∆−1t
)
vY (Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt) (1.33)
This optimal rule is analogous to that of the social planner, (1.31), however
when choosing Yt in addition to considering the reduction in labour disutility
tomorrow, −vX,t+1, the Ramsey planner must also consider the reduction in the
marginal costs of ﬁrms tomorrow, −kX,t+1 as well as additional terms linked to
the marginal revenue, (1−τ)(1−σ−1), and marginal cost, µPt (1−χ)(1+ψ−1)∆−1t ,
of producing output in a decentralised economy which are weighted by the degree
to which ﬁrms pricing decisions, captured in Ft and Kt, are a binding constraint
on the planner's choice of Yt. These weights are φ2,t and φ1,t.
The optimal choice for ∆t is:
θt+β {−vX(Yt+1, Xt+1,∆t+1; ξt+1)− φ2,t+1kX(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt+1)} ∂Xt+1(Yt,Xt,∆t;ξt)∂∆t =
+ v∆(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt) + φ2,tk∆(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt) + θt+1ωΠ
(1+η)
t+1 (1.34)
A similar pattern is seen as with output; when deciding how much price dis-
persion to tolerate the Ramsey planner considers the beneﬁt of increased price
dispersion on future skills resulting in a beneﬁt to having greater price dispersion
today. However the increase in skills due to greater price dispersion (from a higher
labour input requirement for ﬁrms) is in general smaller than the increase in skills
from greater output since:
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Dt ≡ ∂Xt+1/∂Yt
∂Xt+1/∂∆t
= (1 + η)
∆t
Yt
≥ 1
This is true since Dt → 1 when Yt → 1 + η and ∆t → 1. However it can
be seen from (1.27) that for output to rise to such a high level above it's steady
state value16, inﬂation would have to rise which would push ∆t above 1 (1.28).
Thus the key channel through which skills operates is via it's role on increasing
the productivity of households through higher levels of past output.
1.3.2.1 Steadystate
In order to study the optimal response to shocks I linearise these conditions
around the zero inﬂation steady state consistent with the optimality conditions of
the Ramsey problem17. This is the steady state associated with the above 5 FOCs
and the 4 constraints. The steady state is characterised by {F¯ , K¯, ∆¯, Π¯, Y¯ , X¯, θ¯, φ¯}
that solves these 9 equations when ξt = ξ¯. The zero inﬂation steady state has
∆¯ = Π¯ = 1. This immediately implies that K¯ = F¯ from the aggregate supply
relation (1.26). From this result we can ﬁnd the relationship between steady state
output and the production subsidy τ as well as the steadystate stock of skills,
using (1.11):
f(Y¯ ) = k(Y¯ , X¯, ∆¯) ⇐⇒ vh(Y¯ , X¯, ∆¯)
uc(Y¯ )
=
1− τ¯
−1

⇐⇒ Y¯ =
(
1− τ¯
−1
 (1 + η)
)[ 1−φx+µ
γ(1−φx+µ)−µ(1+χ)
]
(1.35)
X¯ = Y¯
µ(1+η)
1−φx+µ (1.36)
This result illustrates the role of the production subsidy in determining whether
this steady state is the (constrained) eﬃcient or ineﬃcient one. From this we
can see that the production subsidy will oﬀset any distortion due to monopolistic
competition if τ = 1−
(

−1
)
. If this is the case and we further assume that α = 0,
that is, constant returns to scale then Y¯ = 1 regardless of the learning parameters
µ and φx. However when diminishing returns to scale are present (α > 0) or if the
production subsidy is too small to neutralise the steadystate eﬀects of monopolistic
competition then these learning parameters can aﬀect Y¯ . To illustrate, suppose
the production subsidy neutralises monopolistic competition and α = 13 . The
impact of stronger learning (higher µ) in this environment is shown in Figure 1 by
16For context, steady state output, Y¯ = 1 + η would require a production subsidy larger
than the output of the entire economy (a subsidy of approximately 158% given the baseline
parametrisation).
17Thus this is not the optimal steady state of the social planner, but only the optimal steady
state from the perspective of a planner that must take actions subject to competitive equilibrium.
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Figure 1.1: Steadystate output and learning
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
 
 
Yce
Ye
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
 
 
tauce
taue
Figure plots the value of Y¯ for 2 diﬀerent values of τ . The eﬃcient case of τ = τe which rises with µ
and the usual subsidy that oﬀsets only monopolistic competition τ = 1 −
(

−1
)
. The values for other
parameters are as assumed in Table 1.
Y ce.
Thus the eﬀect of stronger learning is to reduce Y¯ ce even when τ = 1− −1 . In
competitive equilibrium ﬁrms don't internalise the impact on future productivity
of lower output today this has the eﬀect when combined with diminishing returns
to labour of amplifying the decline in steady state output that these diminishing
returns induce18. This can be contrasted with the level of eﬃcient output consis-
tent with the social planners solution: equation (1.31) in steady state requires the
following production subsidy for Y¯ e = Y¯ ce :
τ e = 1−
(

− 1
)(
1
1− βµ
)
(1.37)
When this subsidy is in place and the determination of output thus includes a
forwarding looking element we see that the presence of learning (µ) acts to undo
the contractionary impact of diminishing returns if learning is strong enough.
The trade-oﬀ between the strength of diminishing returns and learning leading to
higher output is described in Figure 2. The graph shows the level of µ whereby
an increase in µ induces higher output. For low levels of α output rises for all
increases in µ, however as diminishing returns becomes stronger a higher level of
µ is needed before learning induces an increase in output.
18Without diminishing returns an increase in µ induces higher steadystate output
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Figure 1.2: Parameter combinations where LBD dominates diminishing returns to
labour
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This combination of (µ, α) are those where increases in the strength of learning from past employment
will raise the eﬃcient level steady state output (shaded region).Said diﬀerently, any further increases in
µ will increase Y¯ e. For the unshaded region increases in µ lead to a decline in Y¯ e.
Note that if an eﬃcient subsidy is not in place then the size of the distortions in
output in competitive equilibrium relative to the eﬃcient equilibrium are very large
with LBD and relatively small for the standard model. To illustrate suppose τ = 0.
In the standard model this will induce a distortion of output of approximately 4.5%
- which can be seen from (1.35) when the learning parameters are set to 0. However
with µ = 0.15 and φx = 0.8 this gap becomes 13% and 20% if µ = 0.25.
Using the FOCs it is also possible to derive the values of the Lagrange multi-
pliers in (1.32). The following results will be useful in the section to follow:
φ¯2 = −φ¯1 =
UY + βUX
∂X
∂Y
kY − fY + βkX ∂X∂Y
(1.38)
These are the steadystate levels that the Ramsey planner commits to at t =
t0 − 1 which bind her for future periods. The precommitments of the planner,
which constrain her to behave in a consistent way at t0 and all other periods,
entail that the shadow value of the forward looking constraints (φ1 and φ2) are
relevant to the steady state level of output. Intuitively, both steady state output
and the path of output when it evolves according to the choice of a planner acting
from a timeless perspective reduce the inﬂuence of time in a particular way. The
connection between the level of the production subsidy, τ , and the level of these
Lagrange multipliers on the forward looking constraints (Ft and Kt) can be seen
by recognising that the numerator in (1.38) is in fact the steadystate version of
equation (1.31) which states UY + βUX ∂X∂Y = 0. Thus when the optimal subsidy
is in place the value of these multipliers is zero. When τ ≤ τ e then φ¯2 ≥ 0 and
the precommitment made by the policy maker bind for t ≥ t0. How the presence
of a steady state distortion inﬂuences the policy makers target level of output and
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thus response to shocks is discussed next.
1.3.3 The target level of output and the output gap
1.3.3.1 Basic New Keynesian Model
What is the appropriate level of output for the monetary authority to target?
Consider the case without learning. The target level of output ought to be the
level of output that is consistent with price stability (the steady state assumption)
as well as the constraints on the monetary authority in achieving this. Following
Benigno and Woodford (2005) this can be seen to be the ﬁrst order condition for
the Ramsey problem, (1.33) with the omission of the terms depending on Xt, when
prices are ﬂexible:
UY (Y
∗
t , 1; ξt) = φ¯1fy(Y
∗
t ; ξt) + φ¯2ky(Y
∗
t , 1; ξt) (1.39)
The Lagrange multipliers governing the behaviour of (1.23) and (1.24) take
on their steady state values as under ﬂexible prices since ﬁrms pricing decisions
no longer have any dynamic considerations implying f(Yt; ξt) = k(Yt, 1; ξt)∀t.
This equation states the target output is a function of exogenous shocks only19.
Intuitively, since the only friction present in the model (nominal rigidities) is
removed when prices are ﬂexible, the only driver of the target level of output
are shocks hitting the economy. In the case with an additional frictions (learning)
discussed below this will not be the case as the target level of output will depend
on the optimal evolution of workers' skills. This allows us to easily relate the
eﬃcient and natural (ﬂexible price) levels of output to this target level based on
the steady-state production subsidy.
The eﬃcient level of output maximises utility subject only to technology and
exogenous shocks hitting the economy, restating (1.31):
UY (Y
e
t , 1, ξt) = 0 (1.40)
The natural level of output must be consistent with ﬁrms (static) price setting
decision when prices are ﬂexible. The aggregate supply relation, (1.26), entails
that Ft = Kt ∀t which in turn requires:
f(Y nt ; ξt) = k(Y
n
t , 1; ξt)∀t. (1.41)
19A log-linearised version of the equation around the zero inﬂation steady state reveals that:
Yˆ ∗t =
1(
U¯Y Y − φ¯1fY Y + φ¯2kY Y
)
Y¯
(
φ¯1fY ξ + φ¯2kY ξ − U¯Y ξ
)′
ξt
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(1− τ)uY (Y nt ; ξt) =
(

− 1
)
vY (Y
n
t , 1; ξt) (1.42)
Now the links between Y et , Y
n
t and Y
∗
t can be clariﬁed. If τ = 1 − −1 then
(1.42) is just the statement UY (Y nt , 1, ξt) = 0 which means Y
e
t = Y
n
t , that is, the
eﬃcient and natural (or ﬂexible price) level of output are the same since there is
no additional friction to drive a wedge between them e.g. a learning externality
(see the next section). This then also implies φ¯1 = −φ¯2 = UYkY −fY = 0 and thus
Y et ,= Y
n
t = Y
∗
t from (1.39).
1.3.3.2 Learning-by-doing
The target level of output is given by (1.33) when prices are fully ﬂexible:
UY (Y
∗
t , X
∗
t , 1; ξt)+βEt
{
UX(Y
∗
t+1, X
∗
t+1, 1; ξt+1)− φ¯2kX(Y ∗t+1, X∗t+1, 1; ξt+1)
} ∂X∗t+1
∂Y ∗t
=
φ¯1fy(Y
∗
t ; ξt) + φ¯2ky(Y
∗
t , X
∗
t , 1; ξt) (1.43)
Comparison with (1.39) shows that targeting output is no longer a function of
ξt only but now includes dynamic consideration of (X∗t+1, Y ∗t+1; ξ). Moreover the
monetary authority cannot know the target level of output unless they know the
target level of skills, X∗t . Of course, X∗t is nothing but a summary of {Y ∗T }t−1T=t0 . As
such the target level of skills is simply given by X∗t =
(
X∗t−1
)φx−µ ( Y ∗t−1
At−1
)µ(1+η)
.
The eﬃcient level of output would see a social planner choosing output according
to the rule:
UY (Y
e
t , X
e
t , 1; ξt) + βEt
{
UX(Y
e
t+1, X
e
t+1, 1; ξt+1)
} ∂Xet+1
∂Y et
= 0
where skills are Xet =
(
Xet−1
)φx−µ ( Y et−1
At−1
)µ(1+η)
. We can see that the result
of the previous section continues to hold: if φ¯1 = φ¯2 = 0, due to the appropriate
subsidy, then Y et ,= Y
∗
t . The natural level of output must be consistent with the
analogous versions of (1.42) and (1.41):
f(Y nt ; ξt) = k(Y
n
t , X
n
t , 1; ξt) ∀t. (1.44)
(1− τ)uY (Y nt ; ξt) =
(

− 1
)
vY (Y
n
t , X
n
t 1; ξt) (1.45)
Similarly, Xnt =
(
Xnt−1
)φx−µ ( Y nt−1
At−1
)µ(1+η)
. Comparison between Y ∗t and Y nt
shows that even if τ = τ e = 1 −
(

−1
)(
1
1−βµ
)
⇒ φ¯1 = φ¯2 = 0, (1.45) is not
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a restatement of (1.43) as in the BNKM. This is because ﬁrms do not take into
account the dynamic eﬀects of their hiring decision today on costs tomorrow. To
deﬁne an output gap that is zero in the zero inﬂation steady state regardless of
the production subsidy, i.e. even in the case of the distorted steady state that
is studied below, I deﬁne the output gap as ygt = Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t and the skills gap as
xgt = Xˆt − Xˆ∗t .
To more clearly see the implications of the forward looking nature of optimal
policy I log-linearise (1.33) and (1.43) to ﬁnd the following inﬂation-output gap
trade-oﬀ20 (derivation in the appendix):
ζpipit = λEt
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
kX
∂X
∂Y
fY − kY
)j {
Y¯ (ΩY ∆y
g
t+j + βγY ∆y
g
t+j+1) + X¯(ΩX∆x
g
t+j + βγX∆x
g
t+j+1)
}
(1.46)
λ =
1
(fY − kY ) < 0
Where ζpi < 0,ΩY < 0,ΩX > 0, γY < 0 & γX > 0 (under the baseline calibra-
tion in Table 3) are functions of the model parameters and the steady state level
of output (details are in the appendix). Note that
(
kX
∂X
∂Y
fY −kY
)
> 0. Without LBD
this rule would be that found by Woodford (2010) p.60 :
ζpipit = ΥY ∆y
g
t (1.47)
ΥY = λY¯
(
UY Y − φ¯1 (fY Y − kY Y )
)
> 0
In the BNKM the optimal inﬂation-output gap trade-oﬀ21 is between inﬂa-
tion and the growth in the contemporaneous output gap. We can now compare
these to rules to highlight how LBD changes the policy makers behaviour. The
presence of skills creates a link between today's decisions and tomorrows state
of the world making the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ one where the entire present
value of output gap changes is considered when thinking about what is the ap-
propriate level of inﬂation. The forward looking nature of this rule introduces an
output gap smoothing motive not present in the BNKM. The eﬀective discount
rate β
(
kX
fY −kY
)
depends on how strong is the inﬂuence of skills on marginal costs,
kX , relative to the gap between the marginal revenue, fY , and marginal cost, kY ,
20I have here assumed for simplicity that ∆ˆt0−1 = O(||ξ2||) ⇒ ∆ˆt = O(||ξ2||) ∀t (as in the
discussion of the NKPC deviation, equatio (1.27)).
21 Note that both (1.46) and (1.47) capture a trade-oﬀ between pit and ∆y
g
t since
λ¯YΩY
ζpi
< 0
for the former and ΥY
ζpi
< 0. Thus the coeﬃcients have opposite signs.
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of producing output. How much does policy change with this forward looking
rule? This is discussed in the following 2 sections.
1.3.4 The case for price stability
When target output moves in proportion with the ﬂexible-price level of output
then the goal of monetary policy is maximal price stability (i.e. to attempt to
replicate the ﬂexible price equilibrium response to shocks). Woodford (2010);
Benigno and Woodford (2005) have shown that this is true even for the case of
the distorted steady state, τ < τ e = 1− −1 in the BNKM. Here I show that this
result does not hold under LBD.
The response of Y nt to shocks is governed by (1.44) which can be rewritten as:
(1− τ)uY (Y nt ; ξt) =
(

− 1
)
vY (Y
n
t , X
n
t , 1; ξt)
and in log-linear form is:
Yˆ nt −
1 + ψ−1
σ−1 + χ
Xˆnt = −u′ξξt (1.48)
Where uξ is as deﬁned in (1.27). The response of Y ∗t is governed by (1.43)
which can be rewritten:
1 + φ¯2(1− τ)(1− σ−1)
1 + φ¯2(1 + χ)
(

−1
) uY (Y ∗t ; ξt)−βEtvX(Y ∗t+1, X∗t+1, 1; ξt+1)∂X∗t+1∂Y ∗t = vY (Y ∗t , X∗t , 1; ξt)
(1.49)
Using the steadystate value of φ¯2 and under the assumption that LBD is zero
(i.e. the BNKM), these equations show that Y ∗t = Y nt and the result of price
stability holds as in Woodford (2010). However learning entails an additional term
focusing on the implications for the disutility of labour tomorrow. The presence
of ξt+1, Y ∗t+1, X∗t+1 will create a smoothing motive for target output that is absent
in the behaviour of Y nt . The role of LBD depends importantly on the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, σ, as expected when a smoothing motive is present. If
σ > 1 then Yˆ ∗t < Yˆ nt whereas for σ < 1 then Yˆ ∗t > Yˆ nt . However the quantitative
impact is relatively small (Figure 3). The reasons for this behaviour are discussed
in the following section.
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Figure 1.3: Y nt versus Y
∗
t under a technology shock
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1.4 The optimal response to shocks
The optimal response of the Ramsey planner is studied by log-linearising the
5 FOCs and 4 constraints around the steady state described in section 3.2.1. A
perturbation approach is pursued as described in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
The Ramsey solution is studied under shocks to ξ′t =
[
At ξ
C
t ξ
H
t µ
P
t
]
. The
model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency where shocks are temporary but per-
sistent AR(1) processes (see calibration in Table 3) . The simulations compare
three models, the Basic New Keynesian model (i.e. the model with µ = 0), a
model with moderate LBD (µ = 0.15) and a model with strong LBD (µ = 0.25);
in two steadystates, the distorted steady state without any production subsidy
and the Pareto eﬃcient steady state supported by an eﬃcient production subsidy.
The ﬁndings are as follows. The LBD mechanism undoes the 'divine coin-
cidence' (Blanchard and Gali (2005)) that closing the output gap is entailed by
complete price stability. This is because the path of output has stronger impli-
cations for marginal costs and thus inﬂation. This implies that labour supply,
preference/demand and technology shocks are non-trivial matters for monetary
policy. However the strength of this eﬀect is determined by the divergence be-
tween the target level of output, Y ∗t , and the ﬂexible price level of output, Y nt .
Since this divergence is relatively small (as seen in the preceding section) the re-
sultant inﬂation and output gap deviations are small also. In addition there is a
motive to reduce the fall in the output gap in the face of cost-push shocks however
this eﬀect is only present in the distorted steady state. Near the eﬃcient steady
state output falls but the target level of output remains unchanged. Near the
distorted steady state, both output and the target level of output fall, leading to
a smaller output gap. The reasons for this drop in the target level of output are
discussed in detail below.
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Figure 1.4: Optimal policy under a technology shock
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The results for a technology shock, At, indicate a departure from optimal policy
in the standard model: so long as σ 6= 1 there is an inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ (see
ﬁgure 4). The 'divine coincidence' that there is no such trade-oﬀ in the standard
model is broken by a real imperfection. Without such a real imperfection monetary
policy is trivial in response to a variety of shocks (Woodford (2010)): labour sup-
ply, demand/preference shocks and technology shocks. The policy maker simply
ensures that the nominal interest rate matches the path of the real interest rate
consistent with the ﬂexible price equilibrium (the target real interest rate) and
the economy will replicate that ﬂexible price equilibrium with an output gap and
inﬂation rate of zero. How the policy maker responds to this dynamic external-
ity depends on how future consumption is valued relative to consumption today,
parametrised by σ. When σ > 1 households place more value on output growth.
The planner achieves this by returning output to steady state more quickly which
entails returning skills to steady state more quickly. This has the cost of inducing
deﬂation via the marginal cost channel as skills recover more quickly; but this
cost is more than compensated for by the faster output growth. The reverse holds
when σ < 1. When σ = 1 the planner chooses to have output match the path of
technology. This entails that the current level of employment is suﬃcient to pro-
duce this level of output as exogenous productivity changes exactly proportionally
with the required amount these workers must produce.This requires no change in
hours and so no change in the level of skills.
A cost-push shocks creates inﬂationary pressure as ﬁrms raise their desired
mark-ups (see Figure 5). This forces the planner to face a trade-oﬀ between sta-
bilising the output gap and inﬂation even in the Basic New Keynesian model. The
optimal response is price level targeting with initial inﬂation and a small sub-
sequent deﬂation. The presence of positive inﬂation permits a smaller negative
output gap than if the policy maker cared only about inﬂation. As is well known,
to make this gap smaller the policy maker must tolerate higher inﬂation (Gali
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Figure 1.5: Optimal policy under a cost-push shock changes with steady state
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The top set of graphs relates to the solution around the eﬃcient steady state, the bottom to the distorted
steady state.
(2008)). How does LBD aﬀect these results? Near the eﬃcient steady state the
optimal response is broadly similar with LBD: price-level targeting is achieved by
engineering a hump-shaped drop in output (see ﬁgure 5). There are additional
costs to this choice of output in the case of LBD whereby output falls further
as skills depreciate. However these costs are not large enough to make accepting
larger swings in inﬂation worthwhile. An interesting pattern emerges when we
consider the response of the policy maker who operates near the distorted steady
state. When τ < τ e the behaviour of the target level of output changes to take
account of the precommitments made in the steady state by the policy maker op-
erating from a 'timeless perspective' (see equation 1.39). These precommitments
are captured in φ¯1 and φ¯2. The larger the steady state gap between output and
its eﬃcient level the larger these weights become. These weights bind the policy
maker to make decisions taking into account the impact of changes in output on
the marginal costs and revenues of ﬁrms that operate near Y¯ . Marginal revenue
is proportional to fY (Y¯ ) and marginal costs are described by kY (Y¯ , X¯, 1¯) and
kX(Y¯ , X¯, 1¯). fY (Y¯ ) is the same in both the BNKM and LBD models. The dif-
ferences in results are driven by the behaviour of marginal costs. When Y¯ = 1
marginal costs are the same in the standard and LBD model since X¯ = 1, as can
be seen from the steady state result (1.36). When Y¯ > 1 marginal costs are lower
in the LBD model due to the beneﬁcial eﬀects of higher skills on productivity
however, Y¯ < 1 induces low levels of skills pushing marginal costs above those in
the standard model (see Figure 6). Due to this endogenous productivity channel
steady state output is much lower when τ < τ e with LBD than without (see ﬁgure
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Figure 1.6: Marginal cost behaviour and steady state output
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1). For these monopolistically competitive ﬁrms a drop in output lowers marginal
costs and raises marginal revenue. Thus the planner aims to accommodate this
drop in output more in the distorted steady state. For this reason Y ∗t falls with the
cost-push shock near a distorted steady state but is unchanged near the eﬃcient
steady state. The drop in Y ∗t combined with a similar path for Yt as in the eﬃcient
steady state case implies a smaller negative output gap. This mechanism is large
with LBD and inconsequential without it.
Shocks to preferences over consumption and hours worked do not induce any
inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ in the BNKM. As with a technology shock this 'divine
coincidence' result does not hold with LBD. Moreover the nature of the shocks
makes oﬀsetting the inﬂuence of skills more challenging than the case of technology
shocks (where output matching movements in exogenous technology result in no
change in employment). Here the planner wishes to make output fall in response
to a negative shock to consumption or labour supply (see Figures 1.10 & 1.11)
since output is less valued by households. In the case of the preference shock to
consumption the results are similar to those of a technology shock (with σ < 1)
with positive inﬂation and a larger output decline. The policy maker now faces a
negative output gap to achieve price level targeting.
The labour supply shock is slightly diﬀerent in that deﬂation is experienced
on impact with subsequent inﬂation (the reverse of the consumption shock expe-
rience). Why? The Ramsey plan involves engineering a small positive skills gap
as skills value in reducing the disutility of labour is now higher22. The same eﬀect
applies to the value of skills in controlling ﬁrms marginal costs as hiring labour
22From equation (1.29) we can see that ∂
2U(Yt,Xt,∆t;ξt)
∂Xt∂ξ
H
t
> 0
36
1.5. Welfare
has become more expensive. The positive skills gap for the ﬁrst few quarters after
the shock creates expectations that marginal costs will be lower than they oth-
erwise would be without this positive gap. At the time of the shock this drop
in expected future marginal costs is felt in as a mild deﬂation (depending on the
strength of skills). The majority of the negative output and skills gap occurs only
after inﬂation has largely recovered from the shock and is near steady state thus
delaying the impact of the skills-marginal cost channel.
1.5 Welfare
Welfare comparisons are based on steady state output changes required to
make the household indiﬀerent between experiencing the shock and enjoying that
level of output: a value for ζ satisfying:
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0U(Y¯ (1− ζ), X¯, 1; ξ¯) = E0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0U(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt) (1.50)
Table 1.1: Welfare with τ = τ e
(a) Loss in terms of % of steady state output (ζ)
Model / Shocks Cost-push Technology Preference Labour Supply
(1) Standard NK model 0.0078 0.2687 0.3541 0.2531
(2) LBD µ = 0.15 0.0138 0.2827 0.3726 0.4465
(3) LBD µ = 0.25 0.0182 0.2926 0.3858 0.5864
(b) Relative to Standard NK model
Model / Shocks Cost-push Technology Preference Labour Supply
(2) LBD µ = 0.15 1.7740 1.0518 1.0524 1.7644
(3) LBD µ = 0.25 2.3447 1.0889 1.0898 2.3172
The results are presented in Table 1 & Table 2. with absolute losses in percent
of steady state output. The baseline calibration in Table 3 is used. As may be
expected the welfare costs of introducing an additional imperfection to the NK
model raises the costs of business cycles. This can be ascribed to the fact that
the divine coincidence no longer holds meaning that additional costs need to be
incurred either in terms of higher inﬂation or output volatility. The increase in
the welfare cost is most notable for cost push and labour supply shocks.
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1.6 Optimal Simple Rules
Describing monetary policy in terms of Taylor rules is useful for (at least) two
reasons: ﬁrst, it directly and simply explains the trade-oﬀ between output and
inﬂation in terms of interest rate policy and, second, it provides a comparison to
a large body of empirical work estimating these Taylor Rules for central banks
(Taylor (1993) and Clarida et al. (1997)).
To ﬁnd the optimal weights for inﬂation and output in the interest rule for the
policy maker I solve the competitive equilibrium described in the last paragraph of
section 2 where monetary policy is described by the Taylor Rule it = γy (yt/y¯) +
γpipit (following Leith et al. (2012)). This means adding the Taylor rule to the
system comprised of the households optimality conditions (1.3) and (1.4), the
law of motion for skills (1.11), the deﬁnition of the forward looking measures
of marginal costs and revenue for ﬁrms (1.23) and (1.24), the ﬁrms ﬁrst order
condition summarised in aggregate supply relation (1.26), the law of motion for
price dispersion (1.28) and the description for the exogenous stochastic processes
ξt. I assume that an optimal production subsidy is in place, thus the model is
solved around the eﬃcient steady state. The optimal weights γy and γpi are found
from a minimising the welfare loss described in (1.50) by solving the model at
each point on a grid of 300 values for γy ∈ [0, 10] and γpi ∈ (1, 2]23. This is done
for each value of the parameter µ governing the strength of the feedback from
employment to skills ranging from a low of 0.1 to a high of 0.4. Welfare losses are
measured as an average all shocks, i.e. technology, preference, labour supply and
cost-push. Thus these weights are ones that are optimal from the perspective of a
policy maker concerned equally with each of these shocks.
For low levels of the learning parameter, µ ≤ 0.11, γy/γpi → 0 as in the BNKM.
For increases in the learning parameter in the range µ ∈ [0.11, 0.27], it is optimal
for the policy maker to put a higher (but small) weight on output variations
(γy/γpi=2%). High dependence of skills on past hours worked, µ ∈ [0.28, 0.33]
substantially raise the value of output ﬂuctuations to the policy maker where
the weight on output is half that of inﬂation. For very high levels of learning,
µ > 0.34 , output variations matter almost as much as movements in inﬂation
with γy/γpi=87%.
This exercise suggests that for learning by doing to have a quantitatively sig-
niﬁcant impact on the operating policy of a central bank that uses a Taylor Rule,
learning needs to be much stronger than that measured by Chang et al. (2002)
for the US economy. However, it may well be that this learning eﬀect is stronger
23Repeated simulations with γpi ∈ (1, 10] showed that the optimal weight on inﬂation is always
near 1 when µ > 0.11 and for µ < 0.11, γy/γpi → 0 . Since the latter result is preserved with a
smaller grid I use it to gain better accuracy with fewer simulations over the range of interest for
µ.
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in other economies and is plausibly increasing in relevance as exogenous technical
progress leads to higher levels of depreciation in worker skills.
Figure 1.7: The optimal weight on output relative to inﬂation based on a Taylor
Rule
Optimal weights γy and γpi are found from a minimising the welfare loss described in (1.50) by searching
across a grid of 300 values for γy ∈ [0, 10] and γpi ∈ (1, 2]. For each value these weights the competitive
equilibrium described in the last paragraph of section 2 is solved where monetary policy is described by
the Taylor Rule it = γy
(
yt
y¯
)
+ γpipit . This is done for values of the learning feedback parameter from
employment to skills, µ ∈ [0.1, 0.4]. This requires 9300 simulations.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the implications for monetary policy of introducing learning-
by-doing in production into an otherwise standard Basic New Keynesian model.
The time-consistent Ramsey policies are studied in the neighbourhood of the dis-
torted and eﬃcient steady state. The presence of learning introduces two new
channels through which output matters for the policy maker. Firstly a marginal
cost channel whereby changes in output today lead to proportionate changes in
worker productivity tomorrow. Secondly, the presence of learning directly aﬀects
the disutility of labour creating an incentive for the policy maker to avoid raising
this disutility by letting skills depreciate. The presence of this LBD externality
breaks the 'divine coincidence' result, that by stabilising inﬂation the output gap
will automatically be closed, for a variety of shocks that are considered impor-
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tant in explaining business cycles. I ﬁnd that skills induce a small increase in the
importance of the output gap under a cost-push shock but only for the (more re-
alistic case) of a distorted steadystate. The reason for this is due to an interaction
between time-consistent policy choices and signiﬁcant steady state distortions to
output due to the presence of LBD on productivity. The welfare costs of business
cycles are shown to be signiﬁcantly larger when learning eﬀects are strong even
under the optimal policy.
The approach to optimal monetary policy pursued here, following Woodford
(2010), allows for convenient study of diﬀerent steady states by avoiding the need
to derive a purely quadratic approximation to the representative households utility.
This approach may be fruitful in studying time-consistent policy choices where
steady state distortions can be large, due to signiﬁcant real imperfections. Korinek
(2010) and Benigno and Fornaro (2012) have shown that the results of the growth
literature where imported technology drives learning externalities can have large
welfare eﬀects in an open economy setting. Neither of these studies have nominal
rigidities and thus do not study the implications for monetary policy in the context
of an open economy. Building on these results drawing on the framework applied
here to study monetary policy for the small open economy may be a fruitful avenue
for further research.
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1.8 Appendix I: Additional Figures & Tables
1.8.1 Figures
All simulations presented here have used the baseline calibration presented in
Table 3.
1.8.1.1 Optimal Response to shocks with eﬃcient subsidy
The eﬃcient subsidy for the the standard model is τ e = 1 − −1 and τ e =
1−
(

−1
)(
1
1−βµ
)
for the model with learning by doing. These values are assumed
in simulations below.
Figure 1.8: Cost-push shock with τ = τ e
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Figure 1.9: Technology shock with τ = τ e
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Figure 1.10: Labour Supply shock with τ = τ e
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Figure 1.11: Preference shock with τ = τ e
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1.8.1.2 Optimal Response to shocks with τ = 0
Only the response to a cost-push shock is signiﬁcantly altered thus the IRFs
for the remaining shocks are not reported here.
Figure 1.12: Cost-push shock with τ = 0
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1.8.2 Tables
Table 1.2: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Reference
β 0.99 Consistent with 4% annual interest rate
α 0.33 Consistent with a labour share of 23
σ 0.8 Attanasio (1999). Unless stated otherwise.
ψ 1 Dyrda et al. (2012)
 11 Leith et al. (2012)
ω 0.75 Average price duration of 4 quarters, Klenow and Malin (2010)
µ 0.15 Consistent with range in Chang et al. (2002). Unless stated otherwise.
φx 0.79 Chang et al. (2002)
σξµ 0.0016 Smets and Wouters (2003)
σξA 0.0071 Gali and Monacelli (2005)
σξH 0.0166 Smets and Wouters (2003)
σξC 0.0028 Smets and Wouters (2003)
ρµ 0.8 Leith et al. (2012)
ρA 0.91 Adolfson et al. (2007a)
ρH 0.93 Smets and Wouters (2003)
ρC 0.88 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated and follow an AR(1) process with persistence ρand standard
deviation σξ. The model is calibrated to quarterly frequency.
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1.9 Appendix II: Derivations
1.9.1 Derivation of Aggregate Supply relation (1.26)
The ﬁrm able to reset their price at time t will solve the following problem:
max
{Pt(i)}∞t=t0
Et
∞∑
T=t
ωT−tQt,TΠ(Pt(i), PT , YT , XT ; ξT ) (1.51)
ξT refers to the entire collection of shocks that aﬀect ﬁrms pricing decision,
ξ′T =
[
AT ξ
C
T ξ
H
T µ
P
T
]
. µPT refers to a shock to ﬁrms desired steady state
mark-up. Qt,T is the value placed on nominal proﬁts returned to the household T
periods hence:
Qt,T = β
T−tuC(CT , ξ
C
T )
uC(Ct, ξCt )
Pt
PT
= βT−t
(
Yt
YT
ξCT
ξCt
) 1
σ Pt
PT
(1.52)
For the ith ﬁrm nominal proﬁts in period T are simply nominal revenues less
costs:
(1− τ)Pt(i)
(
Pt(i)
PT
)−
YT −WTNT (i) (1.53)
Substituting WTNT (i) using (1.15), (1.16) and (1.4), the ﬁrms problem is:
max
{Pt(i)}∞t=t0
Et
∞∑
T=t
(ωβ)T−t
(
Yt
ξCt
) 1
σ
{(1− τ)Pt(i)1−P T
(
Pt
PT
)
Y
(1− 1
σ
)
T
(
ξCT
) 1
σ
−Pt
(
Pt(i)
PT
)−(1+η)( YT
AT
)(1+χ) ∆ 1ψT
X
(1+ 1
ψ
)
T
1(
ξHT
) 1
ψ
}
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximisation is:
Et
∞∑
T=t
(ωβ)T−t {(1− τ)
(
Pt(i)
PT
)−( Pt
PT
)
Y
(1− 1
σ
)
T
(
ξCT
) 1
σ −
(

− 1
)
(1 + η)
(
Pt(i)
PT
)−(1+η)−1( Pt
PT
)(
YT
AT
)(1+χ) ∆ 1ψT
X
(1+ 1
ψ
)
T
1(
ξHT
) 1
ψ
}
Which can be rearranged as, after imposing Pt(i) = P ∗t :
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Et
∑∞
T=t (ωβ)
T−t
{
(1− τ)
(
P ∗t
PT
)− (
Pt
PT
)
Y
(1− 1
σ
)
T
(
ξCT
) 1
σ
}
Et
∑∞
T=t (ωβ)
T−t
{(

−1
)
(1 + η)
(
P ∗t
PT
)−(1+η)−1 (
Pt
PT
)(
YT
AT
)(1+χ) ∆ 1ψT
X
(1+ 1
ψ
)
T
1
(ξHT )
1
ψ
} = 1
(1.54)
Multiplying by
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−(1+η)
and rearranging we have:
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−(1+η)
=
Et
∑∞
T=t (ωβ)
T−t
{
(1− τ)Y (1−
1
σ
)
T
(
ξCT
) 1
σ
}(
PT
Pt
)(−1)
Et
∑∞
T=t (ωβ)
T−t
{(

−1
)
(1 + η)
(
YT
AT
)(1+χ)
∆
1
ψ
T
(
ξHT
)− 1
ψ X
(1+ 1
ψ
)
T
}(
PT
Pt
)(1+η)
(1.55)
Which rearranged gives equation (1.26):
(
P ∗t
Pt
)
=
(
Ft
Kt
) −1
1+η
(1.56)
1.9.2 Linearised New Keynesian Phillips Curve (1.27)
The linearisation is around the zero inﬂation steady state described by the
Ramsey solution (fully described in 8.3 of this appendix). The law of motion for the
price dispersion (equation 1.28), the forward looking relations Ft, Kt (equations
1.23, 1.24) and the aggregate supply relation (equation 1.26); can be linearised as:
∆ˆt = ω∆ˆt−1 (1.57)
Ft = (1− ωβ)
[
fyYˆt + f
′
ξ ξ˜t
]
+ ωβEt
[
(− 1)Πˆt+1 + Fˆt+1
]
(1.58)
Kt = (1− ωβ)
[
kyYˆt + kXXˆt + k∆∆ˆt + k
′
ξ ξ˜t
]
+ ωβEt
[
(1 + η)Πˆt+1 + Kˆt+1
]
(1.59)
Πˆt =
1− ω
ω
1
1− η (Kˆt − Fˆt) (1.60)
From (1.57) it can be seen that if ∆ˆt0−1 = O(||ξ2||) then ∆ˆt = O(||ξ2||)∀t .
Diﬀerencing (1.59) from (1.58) and substituting out (Kˆt− Fˆt) using (1.60) we have
(1.27) in the main text.
1.9.3 Solution to Ramsey problem in section 3.2
The Ramsey problem outlined above can be described by the Lagrangian:
max
{Ft,Kt,∆t,Πt,Yt}∞t=t0
Lt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0L(Yt, Xt, Ft,Kt,Πt,∆t; θt,φt, ξt) (1.61)
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Where
L(Yt, Xt, Ft,Kt,Πt,∆t; θt,φt, ξt) = U(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)+
φ1,t
[
Ft − f(Yt; ξt)− ωβEtΠ−1t+1Ft+1
]
+φ2,t
[
Kt − k(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)− ωβEtΠ(1+η)t+1 Kt+1
]
+θt
[
∆t − ω∆t−1Π(1+η)t − (1− ω)
(
1−ωΠ−1t
1−ω
) (1+η)
−1
]
+φ3,t
[
1−ωΠ−1t
1−ω −
(
Ft
Kt
) −1
1+η
]
Or equivalently
L(Yt, Xt, Ft,Kt,Πt,∆t; θt,φt, ξt) = U(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)+
θt
[
∆t − ω∆t−1Π(1+η)t − (1− ω)
(
1−ωΠ−1t
1−ω
) (1+η)
−1
]
φ1,t [Ft − f(Yt; ξt)]−ωφ1,t−1
[
Π−1t Ft
]
+φ2,t [Kt − k(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)]−ωφ2,t−1
[
Π
(1+η)
t Kt
]
+φ3,t
[
Kt
(
1−ωΠ−1t
1−ω
) 1+η
−1 − Ft
]
Where the multipliers φ1,t0−1, φ2,t0−1 will capture the precommitments made
at t0 i.e. they will be the values consistent with the steady state solution of the
model (which holds for t0−1)under the same constraints the Ramsey planner faces
for t > t0 .
The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) of the above problem when the Ramsey
planner chooses {Ft,Kt,∆t,Πt, Yt} are:
∂Lt0
∂Yt
= 0 : UY (Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)+β {UX(Yt+1, Xt+1,∆t+1; ξt+1)− φ2,t+1kX(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt+1)} ∂Xt+1∂Yt =
+ φ1,tfy(Yt; ξt) + φ2,tky(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt) (1.62)
∂Lt0
∂∆t
= 0t : U∆(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)+θt+β {UX(Yt+1, Xt+1,∆t+1; ξt+1)− φ2,t+1kX(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt+1)} ∂Xt+1∂∆t =
+ φ2,tk∆(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt) + θt+1ωΠ
(1+η)
t+1 (1.63)
∂Lt0
∂Πt
= 0 : φ3,t
ω(1+η)
1−ω P (Πt)
( 1+η−1 −1)Π−2t Kt+φ1,t−1ω(−1)Π−2t Ft+φ2,t−1ω(1+
η)Π
(1+η)−1
t Kt
+ θt
[
ω(1 + η)∆t−1Π
(1+η)−1
t − ω(1 + η)P (Πt)
(
(1+η)
−1 −1
)
Π−2t
]
= 0 (1.64)
∂Lt0
∂Kt
= 0 : φ3,tP (Πt)
( 1+η−1 ) + φ2,t − φ2,t−1ωβΠ(1+η)t = 0 (1.65)
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∂Lt0
∂Ft
= 0 : −φ3,t + φ1,t − φ1,t−1ωΠe−1t = 0 (1.66)
Where P (Πt) =
(
1−ωΠ−1t
1−ω
)
. In order to study the optimal response to shocks
I linearise these conditions around the optimal steady state24. This is the steady
state associated with the above 5 FOCs and the 4 constraints. The optimal steady
state is characterised by {F¯ , K¯, ∆¯, Π¯, Y¯ , X¯, θ¯, φ¯} that solves these 9 equations
when ξt = ξ¯. This steady state includes the following conditions:
f(Y¯ ) = k(Y¯ , X¯, ∆¯) ⇐⇒ vh(Y¯ , X¯, ∆¯)
uc(Y¯ )
=
1− τ¯
−1

⇐⇒ Y¯ =
(
1− τ¯
−1
 (1 + η)
)[ 1−φx+µ
γ(1−φx+µ)−µ(1+η)
]
(1.67)
X¯ = Y¯
µ(1+η)
1−φx+µ (1.68)
∆¯ = Π¯ = 1 (1.69)
K¯ = F¯ = (1− ωβ)−1f(Y¯ ) (1.70)
φ¯2 = −φ¯1 =
UY + βUX
∂X
∂Y
kY − fY + β ∂X∂Y kX
(1.71)
φ¯3 = (1− ω)φ¯1 (1.72)
θ¯ =
U∆ + βUX
∂X
∂∆
1− ω +
(
k∆ + βkX
∂X
∂∆
) (
UY + βUX
∂X
∂Y
)
1− ω (kY − fY + βkX ∂X∂Y ) (1.73)
These are the steadystate levels that the Ramsey planner commits to at t = t0
which bind her for future periods.
1.9.4 Derivation of pi − ygt trade-oﬀ of Section 3.3.2
The FOC for output in the Ramsey problem (1.32) is:
∂Lt0
∂Yt
= 0 : UY (Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)+βEt {UX(Yt+1, Xt+1,∆t+1; ξt+1)− φ2,t+1kX(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt+1)} ∂Xt+1∂Yt =
+ φ1,tfy(Yt; ξt) + φ2,tky(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt) (1.74)
24Thus this is not the optimal steady state of the social planner, but only the optimal steady
state from the perspective of a planner that must take actions subject to competitive equilibrium.
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Linearised around the steady state described in Section 8.3 of this appendix
this becomes:
Y¯ ΩY Yˆt + X¯ΩXXˆt + Ω∆∆ˆt + Ω
′
ξ ξ˜t
βEt
{
Y¯ γY Yˆt+1 + X¯γXXˆt+1 + γ∆∆ˆt+1 + γ
′
ξ ξ˜t+1
}
(kY − fY )φ˜1,t − βEtkX φ˜2,t+1 = 0 (1.75)
Where for each variable Zˆt ≡ lnZt − ln Z¯ and Z˜t = Zt − Z¯. The equation
deﬁning the target level of output is:
UY (Y
∗
t , X
∗
t , 1; ξt)+βEt
{
UX(Y
∗
t+1, X
∗
t+1, 1; ξt+1)− φ¯2kX(Y ∗t+1, X∗t+1, 1; ξt+1)
} ∂X∗t+1
∂Y ∗t
=
φ¯1fy(Y
∗
t ; ξt) + φ¯2ky(Y
∗
t , X
∗
t , 1; ξt) (1.76)
Linearising this gives:
Ut0 = E0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 {U(Yt, Xt,∆t; ξt)}
Y¯ ΩY Yˆ
∗
t + X¯ΩXXˆ
∗
t + Ω
′
ξ ξ˜t + βEt
{
Y¯ γY Yˆt+1 + X¯γXXˆt+1 + γ
′
ξ ξ˜t+1
}
= 0 (1.77)
The coeﬃcients in both (1.75) and (1.77) are deﬁned by:
ΩY = UY Y +β
∂2X
∂Y 2
(
UX − φ¯2kX
)−φ¯1 (fY Y − kY Y ) < 0; ΩX = UYX+β ∂2X
∂Y ∂X
(
UX − φ¯2kX
)
+φ¯1kY Y > 0
Ωξ = U
′
Y ξ + β
∂2X
∂Y ∂ξ
(
UX − φ¯2kX
)− φ¯1 (f ′Y ξ − k′Y ξ)
γY =
∂X
∂Y
(
UXY − φ¯2kXY
)
> 0; γX =
∂X
∂Y
(
UXX − φ¯2kXX
)
< 0; γξ =
∂X
∂Y
(
U ′Xξ − φ¯2k′Xξ
)
The signs for these coeﬃcients assume the baseline calibration of the model
given in Table 3. (1.75) and (1.77) can be combined into a statement in terms of
the output gap ygt = Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t and the skills gap as xgt = Xˆt − Xˆ∗t :
Y¯ ΩY y
g
t + X¯ΩXx
g
t + βEt
{
Y¯ γY y
g
t+1 + X¯γXx
g
t+1 − kX
∂X
∂Y
φ˜2,t+1
}
= (fY − kY )φ˜1,t (1.78)
Where for simplicity I have again used the assumption that ∆ˆt0−1 = O(||ξ2||)
⇒ ∆ˆt = O(||ξ2||) ∀t and ignored price dispersion. For ease of notation call At ≡
Y¯ ΩY y
g
t + X¯ΩXx
g
t and Bt+1 ≡ Y¯ γY ygt+1 + X¯γXxgt+1. Thus (1.78) can be written
as:
(fY − kY )φ˜1,t = β
(
kX
∂X
∂Y
)
Etφ˜1,t+1 +At + βEtBt+1 (1.79)
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Where I have used the fact that φ˜1,t = −φ˜2,t25. Iterating on (1.79) and assum-
ing no bubble solutions we have:
φ˜1,t =
1
(fY − kY )E
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
kX
∂X
∂Y
fY − kY
)j
{At+j + βEtBt+j+1} (1.80)
Note that
(
kX
∂X
∂Y
fY −kY
)
> 0. Linearising the conditions (1.64), (1.65) and (1.66)
yields the following relationship between inﬂation and the multiplier φ˜1,t:
ζpipit = ∆φ˜1,t (1.81)
ζpi = − θ¯
K¯
(1 + χ)− ω
1− ω (1 + η)
Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of (1.80) to replace the term ∆φ˜1,t in (1.81) we have:
ζpipit =
1
(fY − kY )Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
kX
∂X
∂Y
fY − kY
)j
{∆At+j + βEt∆Bt+j+1} (1.82)
Which can be rearranged using the deﬁnitions of At and Bt+1 as equation
(1.46) in the main text:
ζpipit = λEt
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
kX
∂X
∂Y
fY − kY
)j {
Y¯ (ΩY ∆y
g
t+j + βγY ∆y
g
t+j+1) + X¯(ΩX∆x
g
t+j + βγX∆x
g
t+j+1)
}
(1.83)
λ =
1
(fY − kY ) < 0
25This follows from a linearisation of (1.64), (1.65) and (1.66) as proved by Woodford (2010),
page 58.
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Chapter 2
Noisy news and exchange rates: a
SVAR approach26
Abstract
This paper introduces noisy news shocks into a model of exchange rate de-
termination to measure the impact of these shocks using a SVAR. Agents in the
foreign exchange market make decisions with imperfect information about eco-
nomic fundamentals driving interest rate diﬀerentials between countries in that
they must rely on a noisy signal of future interest rates. I apply the framework
to the USD/GBP nominal exchange rate for the period 1986-2013. Results show
that noisy-news explains approximately one ﬁfth of the forecast error variance in
the nominal exchange rate, with noise accounting for double (12%) that of news
(6%). A historical decomposition of the exchange rate indicates that noise shocks
are especially important during periods of changing monetary policy e.g. the 1990
easing and 2001 tightening of U.S. monetary policy and the unconventional mon-
etary policies surrounding the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008.
JEL classiﬁcation: C32, F31, F41, G15, D84.
Keywords: Exchange rates, SVAR, News, Noise, nonfundamentalness, invert-
ibility.
2.1 Introduction
A large empirical literature exists on explaining the movements in exchange
rates based on shocks to macroeconomic fundamentals (see, for example, Eichen-
baum and Evans (1993), Chari et al. (2002a) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008)). There
is, however, strong evidence that exchange rates are not driven by the same shocks
that drive other macroeconomic variables: exchange rates lack the cyclical pat-
tern of macro variables (Baxter and Stockman (1989)), have a surprisingly weak
relationship with those variables past and present values (Flood and Rose (1995))
and, famously, are forecast more reliably by a random walk than a model based
on economic fundamentals (Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) and Rossi (2013)). Recent
theoretical work has addressed this exchange rate disconnect puzzle by focusing
on the kind information that agents use to make decisions in asset markets and in
particular on news about macroeconomic conditions.
Duarte and Stockman (2005) deliver a model where news shocks lead agents
to rationally update their beliefs about risk premia leading to exchange rate be-
26Reprinted from Journal of International Money & Finance , Vol 58, Chris Redl, Noisy news
and exchange rates: a SVAR approach, 150-171, Copyright (2015), with permission from Elsevier
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havior that is independent of changes in macro variables. Ilut (2012), building
on the models of Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop
(2006), models agents as ambiguity averse investors who receive noisy news about
productivity. His model is consistent with the empirical regularities of delayed
appreciation following an interest rate shock, a higher likelihood of large rapid
depreciation or crash risk, and momentum trading proﬁts. While news based
models of exchange rates are theoretically appealing they entail two diﬃculties in
identifying news shocks in the data.
News entails that agents decisions depend on an unobservable state variable
- the time lapse from when news arrived to when the shock is realised. This
anticipation will be reﬂected in the data that agents generate. For example, pound
sterling may appreciate prior, and respond less on impact, to an increase in U.K.
interest rates if agents receive news. An econometrician using the set of observable
macroeconomic variables, such as interest rates, exchange rates, GDP, prices and
so on, will not be able to distinguish the anticipatory eﬀects from the direct eﬀects
of shocks. This informational gap between the agents and the econometrician
can be closed by increasing the information set of the econometrician using, for
example, a Factor Augmented VAR (Bernanke et al. (2005)).
Noise in the signal of future shocks deepens the problem: agents make decisions
without knowing whether innovations will be realized (news) or not (noise). Thus
even the information set of the agents is not suﬃcient to identify news and noise
shocks. The solution pursued in this paper uses the fact that agents learn in
subsequent periods whether a signal received in the past is borne out (news) or
not (noise) and correct their behaviour using the signal. This correction, reﬂected
in observables, then distinguishes past news from noise. In this way news and
noise shocks are identiﬁed using past, present and future values of observables.
In the structural VAR (SVAR) literature, identiﬁcation problems due to antic-
ipation are a subset of well known problems due to insuﬃcient information lead-
ing to non-invertible moving average representations (Sargent and Hansen (1990),
Lippi and Reichlin (1994) and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2007)). Identiﬁcation
problems due to noisy news have been addressed by resorting to estimation of a
fully speciﬁed DSGE model as pursued by Blanchard et al. (2009) and Barsky
and Sims (2012) who, respectively, ﬁnd evidence of noise and news in driving the
business cycle. However, a signiﬁcant cost to this estimation strategy, especially
given the short comings of DSGE models of exchange rate determination, is the
sensitivity to modeling assumptions.
The aim of this paper is to study an alternative, less restrictive, scheme to
identify noisy-news shocks aﬀecting exchange rates. I pursue a SVAR using the a
scheme recently proposed by Forni et al. (2013b) to identify the impact of noisy
news about interest rates on the USD/GBP exchange rate. This identiﬁcation
procedure involves two steps. First, SVAR identiﬁcation based on standard meth-
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ods to identify shocks using the agents information set27. Second, restrictions are
imposed on the relationship between the shocks identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step and
noise and news shocks. These restrictions are derived from a simple model of
exchange rate determination under noisy news. The restrictions are expressed as
dynamic rotations of the shocks identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step. This dynamic rotation
makes use of Blaschke factors (Lippi and Reichlin (1994)) which result in news and
noise shocks that are linear combinations of the past, present and future values of
shocks from the ﬁrst step. The restrictions imposed by the theory are suﬃcient
to identify the autoregressive relationship between news and interest rates at the
ﬁrst step allowing identiﬁcation of the appropriate Blaschke factor to use in the
second step 28. Forni et al. (2013b) developed this methodology to identify noisy
news about total factor productivity and applied it to measure the role of noise
shocks on stock prices in the U.S (Forni et al. (2013a)). Mertens and Ravn (2010)
have used a related identiﬁcation strategy to identify the eﬀects of anticipated
government spending shocks.
The model assumes agents have imperfect information on economic fundamen-
tals that will determine the path of interest rates and rely on a noisy signal of their
value. This implies the exchange rate can diverge from the level determined by
the present value of economic fundamentals during periods where noise shocks
predominate. However, as the interest rate diﬀerential is a function of lagged eco-
nomic fundamentals, agents learn which signals represented news vs. noise once
future interest rates are realized - ensuring the exchange rate returns to a level
consistent with economic fundamentals.
The main contribution of this paper is to measure the contribution of shocks to
interest rate expectations to movements in the USD/GBP over the October 1986
to February 2013 period. I ﬁnd that a positive shock to expectations of the U.S. -
U.K. interest rate diﬀerential results in delayed dollar appreciation, where agents
purchase dollars but not in suﬃciently large quantities that the entire appreciation
takes place on impact. This is consistent with the Bayesian updating behaviour
assumed in the simlpe model put forward in section 2. Using yields on 10 year
bonds and contrary to previous SVAR studies using short term yields that do not
include expectations of interest rates (for example, Eichenbaum and Evans (1993)
, Chari et al. (2002a); Scholl and Uhlig (2008)), I do not ﬁnd evidence of delayed
dollar appreciation in response to a shock to the interest rate diﬀeretial but rather
a depreciation on impact followed by a mild appreciation. Decomposing shocks to
27This ﬁrst step will suﬀer from the non-invertibility problems mentioned above given anticipa-
tion by agents. A factor augmented VAR is pursued in the empirical section to ensure suﬃcient
information to identify shocks to the agents information set. This is tested using the procedure
of Forni and Gambetti (2014) see section 5.2.
28Blaschke factors are not unique. They can be used to illustrate the multiplicity of MA
representations when, for example, anticipation is important see e.g. Canova (2007). However,
the relationship between news and interest rates in the model above pins down a unique Blaschke
factor after estimation of the ﬁrst step.
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interest rate expectations into news and noise, I ﬁnd that that between 3-6% of the
variation in the exchange rate is accounted for by news shocks, whereas 12-14% is
due to noise present in that news (depending on identiﬁcation scheme employed).
News shocks induce a period of delayed dollar depreciation in the ﬁrst 3 months
after the shock followed by a protracted period of mild appreciation. The eﬀect of
noise shocks is the opposite, a period of dollar appreciation lasting approximately
3 months followed by mild depreciation. Noise shocks are largest during periods
of changing monetary policy, when agents ﬁnd it harder to guage future interest
rates and expectational errors are larger, e.g. the 1990 easing and 2001 tightening
of U.S. monetary policy; and the unconventional monetary policies surrounding
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008.
These ﬁndings relate to the theoretical exchange rate literature in a number
of ways. Firstly, Reproducing the empirical regularity of a negative correlation
between exchange rate depreciation and interest rate diﬀerentials, found in both
single equation UIP tests and the SVAR literature documenting delayed dollar
appreciation, is a key goal of theoretical models of exchange rate determination
(Engel (2014)). Using yields on 10 year bonds, I ﬁnd that delayed dollar appre-
ciation is not robust to controlling for interest rate expectations suggesting that
this goal may not be appropriate for models of exchange rates based on dispersed
information or models using longer term interest rates. Secondly, New Keynesian
models of exchange rate determination have struggled to replicate exchange rate
dynamics and volatility without resorting to exogenous risk premuim shocks to the
UIP equation (see Chari et al. (2002b); Jung (2007) and Adolfson et al. (2007b)).
Benigno et al. (2012) provide a recent attempt to endogenise these UIP risk shocks
by incorporating time-varying uncertainty in monetary policy in a New Keynesian
model. Through this mechanism they successfully replicate the negative correla-
tion of exchange rate depreciation and short term interest rate diﬀerentials. The
ﬁnding in the current paper, that the role of noise shocks is greatest during periods
of changing monetary policy complements those ﬁndings and suggests an alterna-
tive mechanism (expectational errors) through which monetary policy unceratinty
may inﬂuence exchange rates. Thirdly, this paper complements the ﬁndings of
high frequency news studies, such as Clarida and Waldman (2008), showing that
expectational errors, that are independent of changes in macroeconomic funda-
mentals, are important drivers of exchange rates. However, I document these
eﬀects at the frequency targeted by theoretical models of exchange rate determi-
nation (monthly or quarterly). Finally, the theoretical (and empirical) literature
on exchange rates has focused almost exclusively on short term yields (3 months or
less) however I ﬁnd that modelling the role of longer term yields may be important
for understanding exchange rate behaviour29.
29An earlier version of this paper employed short term interest rates ﬁnding that the impact of
noisy news explained only 9.5% of the forecast error variance of changes in the USD/GBP where
as using long rates doubles this ﬁgure. I am am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model of exchange rate determination under imperfect information and relates it
to the identiﬁcation scheme employed in estimation. Section 3 describes the esti-
mation of the SVAR. Section 4 describes the data, section 5 presents the empirical
results and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model
This section describes a simple, partial equilibrium model of exchange rate
determination based on uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) and noisy exogenous
interest rates30 . UIP requires that the expected return on assets abroad (ift +
Et∆st+1) be the same as the return on assets of similar risk at home (iht ) : i
h
t =
ift +Et∆st+1, where st ≡USD/GBP. This can be solved forward to link the value
of the exchange rate to expected future interest rates:
st = k − Et
∞∑
j=0
it+j (2.1)
Where it ≡ iht − ift . I take the long run level of the nominal exchange rate,
as given, k = limT→∞Etst+T+131. This formulation of UIP emphasises the role
of the term structure of interest rates in determining exchange rates as recently
emphasised by Anderson et al. (2010) and Sarno et al. (2012). Interest rates are a
function of monetary policy which in turn is a function of economic fundamentals
such as inﬂation, the output gap, past interest rates, technology, monetary policy
shocks and so on. News , at, about these economic fundamentals drive future
interest rates: it = c(L)at. Where c(L) is a lag polynomial and c(0) = 0 since at
is a news shock. This restriction also ensures that agents don't know at at time
t via the observability of it. Agents know the coeﬃcients in c(L), however, they
have imperfect information on the value of at and must rely on a noisy signal, zt of
this news: zt = at + et. Where at ∼iid N(0, σ2a) and et ∼iid N(0, σ2e) are news and
noise shocks respectively. Agents make the best use of their limited information
set, Ωt, to predict the behavior of at by using the signal zt:
this change.
30
As opposed to developing a New Keynesian model where the exchange rate is determined as
the present value of variables found in the Taylor rules of two countries; as is common in the
forecasting literature (see Rossi (2013) for a review). The beneﬁt being that the model used
above is consistent with a larger set of more fully speciﬁed models.
31Purchasing power parity motivates the claim that limT→∞Et
(
st+T+1 + p
f
t+T+1 − pht+T+1
)
=
q, a constant. Biannual IMF 5 year ahead forecast data for 2008-2014 supports the claim
that long run inﬂation forecast diﬀerences for the U.S-U.K. are approximately constant: the
diﬀerences average 10 basis points with a standard deviation of 20 basis points. Supporting the
claim that limT→∞Et
(
pft+T+1 − pht+T+1
)
is constant and so limT→∞Et (st+T+1) must be for
PPP to hold. Additionally, I assume that the long run interest rate gap converges to zero in
expectation, i.e. limT→∞Et|it+T+1| = 0.
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E [at|Ωt] =
(
σa
σz
)2
(at + et) = γzt (2.2)
Where γ ≡ σ2a
σ2z
, 0 < γ < 1, reﬂecting the usefulness of the signal in predicting
at. Thus the full information case is where γ = 1 and zt = az. In this environment,
agents have two sources of information which they use to determine the value of
the exchange rate. Firstly, they form expectations about the level of future interest
rates using information from the signal, zt. Secondly, the realized value of interest
rates today, it, reveals information about the level of economic fundamentals which
agents predicted in the past. Agents use this information to correct their previous
predictions about the exchange rate.
2.2.1 Identiﬁcation
The relationship between the interest rate diﬀerential (it), the signal (zt) and
changes in the exchange rate (∆st) can be summarised as the the MA representa-
tion:
xt = C(L)wt (2.3)
 itzt
∆st
 =
 c(L) 0 01 1 0
sa(L) se(L) 1

 atet
ηt
 (2.4)
Where c(L), sa(L) and se(L) are lag polynomials, whose coeﬃcients are known
to agents; at and et are news and noise shocks respectively; and a shock to the
exchange rate has been added, ηt. Using the UIP equation (2.1) and the Bayesian
updating behaviour captured in (2.2), the solution for the exchange rate under an
arbitrary c(L), such that c(0) = 0, is given by sa(L) and se(L) (see appendix).
In the simple case where c(L) = L so that it+1 = at we have that sa(L) =
−γ − (1 − γ)L + L2 and se(L) = −γ(1 − L). This case be used to illustrate
how the model captures two relevant empirical regularities of exchange rates: slow
incorporation of news and exchange rate disconnect. The ﬁrst can be seen form
the impact response of the exchange rate to news under full information (−1)
compared to imperfect information (−γ): Agents respond only in proportion to
the reliability of the signal, γ. However, news is fully incorporated after one period
(−γ− (1−γ) = −1) when it+1 reveals at. Exchange rate disconnect results in the
short run from a noise shock (−γ) but does not have long run eﬀects (−γ+γ = 0).
Unfortunately, this representation cannot be recovered by inverting a VAR on
data for the observables (it, zt,∆st) since the determinant of this matrix vanishes
inside the unit circle entailing a non-invertible MA representation (Lippi and Re-
ichlin (1994), Blanchard et al. (2009)). The shocks above are not innovations to
agents information set at time t since agents cannot distinguish between news and
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noise. Thus the data that they generate from decisions at time t cannot reveal
these values. Instead, agents make decisions based on shocks to the signal, zt,
and new information revealed by the realised interest rate about past interest rate
predictions which I call, following Forni et al. (2013a), a learning shock, ut. These
shocks can be recovered from data generated by agents at time t. The model above
imposes a suﬃciently close relationship between the learning and signal shocks and
the noise and news shocks to identify the latter. That relationship is illustrated by
a Wold decomposition of the observables in terms of learning and signal shocks.
The relationship between the interest rate and the signal is given by the as-
sumption that at time t − 1, agents use the signal to predict it as E[it|Ωt−1]
=γc(L)zt. There are two restrictions that identify the relationship between learn-
ing shocks and the interest rate. Firstly, by the deﬁnition of ut as an innovation
to the agents information set, it must be known by agents at time t. Secondly,
the way agents use the signal to predict it combined with the observability of it
at time t, imposes the restriction that ut must ensure that agents update their
predictions to match the observed it at t. The decomposition is achieved by sep-
arating c(L) into two parts using a Blaschke factor (Lippi and Reichlin (1994);
Forni et al. (2013b); Leeper et al. (2013)). The Blaschke factors are given by:
b(L) =
J∏
j=1
L− rj
1− r¯jL (2.5)
Where rj = 1, . . . , J are the roots of c(L) that are smaller than one in modulus
and r¯j is the complex conjugate. Using Blaschke factors it is possible to factorise
c(L) into a lag polynomial with roots inside the unit circle, b(L), and one that
has all its root outside the unit circle, g(L): c(L) = b(L)g(L). Thus the lag poly-
nomial c(L)b(L) = g(L) does not vanish inside the unit circle. This implies that g(L)
satisﬁes the ﬁrst identifying restriction since it captures the relationship between
the interest rate and news via information that agents have received at time t,
that is ut. The second restriction imposes that when the information about past
values of at and et come to light via ut, that the interest rate diﬀerential fully
reﬂects these values, that is it = c(L)at in each period. For this to occur learning
shocks must provide the the right re-weighting to noise and news that accounts
for the downward bias implied by Bayesian updating (i.e. γ) and the information
in c(L) that is only available to agents from future realisations of it i.e. the infor-
mation not included in g(L), that is, b(L)32. This information captured in b(L) is
not known at time t (leading to non-invertibility via roots inside the unit circle).
However, the structure of the model entails that agents learn this information from
future realisations of it. This depends on the dynamic relationship between news
and the interest rate and may take many periods for all information to become
32In the 1 period case above the factorisation of c(L) is given by applying (2.5), b(L) = L and
g(L) = L
L
= 1
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available. This learning time is captured by the order of b(L). This implies that
ut = (1− γ)b(L)at − γb(L)et and the decomposition of the interest rate is:
it = g(L)ut + γc(L)zt (2.6)
it = γc(L)at︸ ︷︷ ︸+ c(L)b(L)(1− γ)b(L)at︸ ︷︷ ︸+ γc(L)et︸ ︷︷ ︸−
c(L)
b(L)
γb(L)et︸ ︷︷ ︸ = c(L)at (2.7)
prediction correction prediction correction
The full Wold decomposition is then:
xt = D(L)vt (2.8)
 itzt
∆st
 =
 g(L) γc(L) 00 1 0
su(L) sz(L) 1

 utzt
ηt
 (2.9)
Where
vt = B(L)wt (2.10)
 utzt
ηt
 =
 (1− γ)b(L) −γb(L) 01 1 0
0 0 1

 atet
ηt
 (2.11)
Where sz(L) and su(L) are derived in the appendix. Unlike the MA represen-
tation in news and noise (2.4), the MA representation in learning and signal shocks
(2.9) is recovered by inverting a VAR on data for the observables (it, zt,∆st). By
construction, g(L) has no roots inside the unit circle leading to an invertible MA
representation. The Bayesian updating behaviour of agents assumed in the model
means that the relationship between the interest rate and the signal, γc(L), can
also be recovered. This allows c(L) to be found and thus b(L) constructed as per
(2.5). b(L) and an estimate of γ (see section 3 below) allows the the construction
of the dynamic rotation matrix (2.11). Equation (2.11) illustrates the relationship
between this identiﬁcation scheme and the standard SVAR identiﬁcation. The
structural shocks, wt, are recovered from the shocks, vt, using the restriction ma-
trix B(L)−1. In standard SVAR identiﬁcation this matrix is constant33 whereas
here it is a dynamic relationship:
33That is wt = Rvt where choosing R = B
−1 identiﬁes the model. A variety of restrictions have
been employed in the literature, e.g. recursive ordering between shocks, short-run restrictions,
long-run restrictions or sign restrictions on the impact of structural shocks (see for example
Lutkepohl (2011)).
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vt = B(L)wt ⇒ wt = B(L)−1vt (2.12)
 atet
ηt
 =
 b(F ) γ 0−b(F ) (1− γ) 0
0 0 1

 utzt
ηt
 (2.13)
Where b(L)−1 = b(L−1) = b(F ) and F is the forward operator. Thus to
recover the news and noise shocks future values of the learning and signal shocks
are required. The intuition is that agents don't observe these shocks but learn
their value in the future, thus once agents have suﬃcient information available to
identify what shocks took place in the past, the econometrician can recover them.
Impulse responses from the innovations to news and noise can be recovered from
D(L)B(L) =
[
C(L)B(L)−1
]
B(L) = C(L).
Figure 2.1: Level of exchange rate under AR(1) process for interest rate diﬀerential
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∆st = su(L)ut + sz(L)zt and γ = 0.5. The interest rate (it) follows AR(1) process in news:
i =
∑∞
k=1 c
kat−k, where c = 0.66.
To illustrate these mechanisms, the case of it following an AR(1) process, sub-
ject to the requirement that c(0) = 0, is given in ﬁgure 2.1 - showing the deviation
of the level of the exchange rate from steady state. The full information solution
shows that a news shock requires the USD/GBP exchange rate to appreciate fully
on impact, followed by exponential depreciation following the AR(1) process for
it. On impact, under imperfect information, agents underestimate the news shock
in proportion to γ = 0.5. However, new information arrives in period 1 and 2
from ut indicating further appreciation. After 2 periods all information about
the shock has been revealed and the imperfect information path for the exchange
rate is identical to the full information case. For a noise shock, agents with full
information ignore noise, however agents making predictions using the signal pre-
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dict the same outcome for the exchange rate as under the news shock. Updates
received in period 1 and 2 indicate that this was in fact a noise shock and thus
a required depreciation relative to the prediction so that after period 2 the noise
shock has no impact.
2.3 Estimation of News and Noise Shocks
Estimation of news and noise shocks follows the two step identiﬁcation scheme
of Forni et al. (2013a) . In the ﬁrst step, I identify the learning and signal shocks
corresponding to equation (2.9) using standard SVAR methods. In the second
stage, I impose restrictions on the relationship between those shocks and the news
and noise shocks using the framework outlined in section 2.2.
In order to capture the contemporaneous inﬂuence of other macroeconomic
variables on the the exchange rate (as opposed to news about them) and to ensure
that the VAR contains suﬃcient information to recover the learning and signal
shocks, I add a vector of variables wt with additional shocks in the system given
by t . Agents observe the shocks t. For ease of presentation ∆st is included in
the set wt . This vector includes additional variables thought to be important to
exchange rate behaviour: cyclical output diﬀerences and inﬂation rates (Scholl
and Uhlig (2008)) as well as a set of factors capturing the principal components
of a large set of US and UK macroeconomic variables (see Table 2.1, Table 2.2
and the additional appendix for the data set used to construct the factors). The
signal shocks, zt, are not directly observable. I assume that market expectations
of interest rates, denoted by xt, reveal these shocks in the form of innovations to
xt. This augments the representation (2.9) as a 10 variable FAVAR (Bernanke
et al. (2005)):
xt = D(L)vt (2.14)
 itxt
wt
 =
 g(L)σu c(L)γσz k(L)d(L)σu f(L)σz p(L)
q(L) h(L) M(L)

 ut/σuzt/σz
t
 (2.15)
Where q(L),h(L),k(L),p(L) and M(L) are matrix polynomials in the lag op-
erator. M(L) relates the vector wt to its own shocks, t, k(L) and p(L) indicate
the response of it and xt, respectively, to the shocks t. q(L) and h(L) give the
response of the vector wt to the learning, ut, and signal shocks, zt. This is the
system I will take to the data for the ﬁrst step which reveals the response of the
system to learning and signal shocks. With an estimate of D(L) and vt , I can use
the appropriate B(L) matrix34 to recover C(L) as the second step to reveal the
34
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structural shocks wt as described in section 2.1. The structural representation is
then:
xt = C(L)wt (2.16)
 itxt
wt
 =
 c(L)σa −γg(L)b(L)σe + γc(L)σe k(L)(1− γ)d(L)b(L)σa + f(L)σa −γd(L)b(L)σe + f(L)σe p(L)
q(L)(1− γ)b(L)σaσu + h(L)
σa
σz
−γq(L)b(L)σeσu + h(L)
σe
σz
M(L)

 at/σaet/σe
t

(2.17)
The model outlined in section 2 interprets the response of the interest rate to
interest rate shocks as learning shocks. To the degree that this interpretation holds
in the data, the estimate for g(L) will be related to the response of the interest
rate to signal shocks such that g(L) = c(L)b(L) . In this case the interest rate will not
respond to noise shocks at any lag: −γg(L)b(L)σe + γc(L)σe = −γ c(L)b(L)b(L)σe +
γc(L)σe = 0. However, estimation only imposes restrictions via b(L) which in
turn depends solely on the estimated c(L), the relationship between interest rate
expectations and the actual interest rate. For example, b(0) = c(0) = 0 means
an impact eﬀect of zero. The estimated impulse response function (IRF) of the
interest rate to noise provides a test of how well this model holds in the data.
The response of ∆st to learning shocks is unrestricted but I impose the long run
restriction that signal shocks have no long run eﬀect on the level of the exchange
rate st - i.e. I impose that the sum of the IRF of ∆st to xt is zero. The degree
to which the behaviour posited by the model of section 2 is borne out depends
only on b(L) and this long run restriction. To estimate the IRFs I undertake the
following steps in the Forni et al. (2013a) identiﬁcation scheme.
2.3.1 Step 1: Identify learning and signal shocks
Estimate the unrestricted VAR in (2.15) to recover the MA representation.
The learning and signal shocks, ut and zt are recovered using standard SVAR
techniques. I use a combination of short and long run restrictions following Lutke-
pohl (2005). Consider the model as three blocks: the slow moving variables, the
block comprising the noisy-news model , and a block of fast moving variables, see
Table 2.2. I impose a Cholesky recursive short run restrictions on the variables in
the ﬁrst block i.e. the output gap can respond only with a lag to all other shocks
Which is:
 (1− γ)b(L)σa/σu −γb(L)σe/σu 0′σa/σz σe/σz 0′
0 0 In−2
 ,where n is the number of variables
in the VAR.
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to slow moving variables. I also impose short run restrictions that no shocks to
variables outside the slow moving block can have a contemporaneous eﬀect on the
variables in the slow moving block. This is motivated by the convention in the
SVAR literature that slower moving macroeconomic variables such as output and
prices are ordered before fast moving expectational and ﬁnancial variables (see for
example Popescu and Smets (2010)). For the noisy-news model block, following
the model outlined above I impose no contemporaneous eﬀect of xt shocks on it i.e.
c(0) = 0. However, I allow shocks to ∆st to inﬂuence both it and xt and the fast
moving variables. As noted above, I impose the long run restriction that signal
shocks have no long run eﬀect on st. This restriction is suﬃcient to ensure that
noise shocks have no long run eﬀect on st. The ﬁnal block is composed of 4 leading
principal components of a large dataset of fast moving U.K. and U.S. macro vari-
ables, primarily ﬁnancial. I allow shocks to these fast moving variables to inﬂuence
each other, interest rate expectations and the exchange rate contemporaneously.
2.3.2 Step 2: Identify news and noise shocks
The structural representation (2.17) requires an estimate of c(L) from which
b(L) can be constructed. This can be recovered from the ﬁrst step estimate of the
response of it to zt, see (2.15). An estimate of the news-to-noise variance ratio(̂
σa
σe
)
can be recovered from the ratio of the sum of the coeﬃcients for the IRF of
the interest rate response to learning and to signal shocks:
g(1)σu
c(1)γσz
=
c(1)
b(1)σu
c(1)γσz
=
1
b(1)
σa
σe
. Using that σuγσz =
σuσz
σe
= σaσe and that from (2.5), b(1) = 1
35. From this
estimate of
(̂
σa
σe
)
, estimates of the news-to-signal and noise-to-signal variance
ratios can be recovered using the structure of news, noise and signal assumed in
(2.4):
(
σa
σz
)2
+
(
σe
σz
)2
= 1. This then implies that
(̂
σa
σz
)
= sin(arctan( σ̂aσe )) and(̂
σe
σz
)
= cos(arctan( σ̂aσe )). This, along with the IRFs from step 1, gives all the
elements required to describe the IRFs for news and noise (2.17). The news and
noise shocks can then be recovered in using the inversion procedure in (2.12) as a
function of the future values of the learning and signal shocks.
2.4 Data
I estimate (2.15) on U.S.-U.K. monthly data for October 1986 to February
2013. The data sources are described in table 2.1. I use shocks to a proxy for mar-
ket interest rate expectations, xt, to correspond to the signal shocks, zt, described
in the model of section 2. I measure U.S. interest rate expectations as the 1 year
ahead median federal funds rate forecast from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve's
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). For the U.K., I use 1 year ahead median
35In these calculations I truncate the IRFs at a lag length of 60 periods.
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forecasts for the Bank of England bank rate drawn from Her Majesty's Treasury
survey of independent forecasters. This choice of proxy is based on comparability
of each dataset (since they both are survey measures of similar rates with the same
horizon) and this measure leads to signal shocks with a sizeable news component.
Alternative measures are considered in section 5.6 on robustness.
The baseline FAVAR includes 10 variables: ﬁve macro variables and ﬁve fac-
tors derived from a large data36 set of monthly macroeconomic data from the U.S.
and U.K (see table 2.2). The factor variables are extracted as leading principal
components. These factors are divided into slow moving (responding to interest
rates with a lag, e.g. output and prices) and fast moving (contemporaneous re-
sponse to interest rates, e.g. ﬁnancial variables). The inclusion of these factors is
based on passing a test of suﬃcient information after being included in the VAR
in order to capture the structural shocks as outlined in Forni and Gambetti (2014)
- described fully in section 5.2. This test was passed once 1 slow moving and 4
fast moving factors were included.
Table 2.1: Data Description
Variable ∆st pit yt xt it
US . CPI US GDP Phil. Fed SPF 1 year 10 year
(% change) (cyclical) ∗† aheadmedian forecast for bond yield
the Federal funds rate∗
UK Nominal GDP Deﬂator UK GDP HM Treasury survey 1 year 10 year
USD/GBP (% change)∗ (cyclical )† aheadmedian forecast for the bond yield
Bank of England bank rate
Source FRED FRED FRED / NISER Phil. Fed. / HM Treasury• FRED
Transformation Diﬀerence US - UK U.S. - UK in levels U.S. - UK in levels U.S. - UK in levels
Data period is October 1986 to February 2013. ∗Quarterly data temporally disaggregated to monthly using the method
of Santos Silva and Cardoso (2001). †Cyclical component recovered from HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter
λ = 129600 (Ravn and Uhlig (2002)). •Kindly provided by Haroon Mumtaz, individual surveys available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/data-forecasts
In order to run a monthly VAR some quarterly data must be temporally disag-
gregated. This data is: market expectations of T-Bill rates found in the Philadel-
phia Fed Survey of Professional forecasters, the U.K. GDP deﬂator and U.S. GDP.
Temporal disaggregation was achieved via the method of Santos Silva and Cardoso
(2001) which updates the Chow-Lin best linear interpolation procedure (Chow and
Lin (1971)) for dynamic models. This method temporally disaggregates the quar-
terly data using a linear regression model based on monthly indicators. I used
industrial production and private consumption expenditure for U.S. GDP, indus-
trial production and retail sales for the U.K. GDP deﬂator and implied interest
rates from the Eurodollar Futures contract prices on the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
36See the additional appendix for a full description of this data set - which is an updated
version of the Stock and Watson (2001) data for the U.S. and similar monthly series for the U.K.
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change (CME) for the SPF data. The impact of temporal disaggregation is checked
by estimation using quarterly data, see robustness section below.
Table 2.2: 10 variables included in the VAR
Slow moving
yt U.S. less U.K. cyclical output gap
pit U.S. less U.K. inﬂation rate
F1,t Slow moving factor (ﬁrst principal component)
Noisy-news model
it U.S. less U.K 10 year government bond yield
xt U.S. less U.K survey expectations of 1 year ahead central bank rate
∆st Change in nominal exchange rate (USD/GBP)
Fast moving F2,t Fast moving factors (ﬁrst 4 principal components)
2.5 Results
2.5.1 FAVAR estimation
The FAVAR is estimated in step 1 of section 3.1 using both short and long run
restrictions. I estimate the model in levels with 3 lags (1 quarter) based on the
Akaike information criteria 37.
2.5.2 Test of suﬃcient information to identify structural shocks
The model of section 2 showed that if UIP holds and agents form expectations
about future interest rates using a noisy signal then the news and noise shocks
moving agents expectations will lead to a MA representation of the model that
is non-invertible in past observables, see equation (2.4). It was shown that it is
possible to recover these shocks from future values of observables, see equations
(2.9) and (2.11). However, it is still possible that the shocks recovered in step 1
(learning and signal) and step 2 (news and noise) of the identiﬁcation scheme are
correlated with observables that agents can use to make decisions. This would
be due to the VAR estimated in step 1 containing insuﬃcient information to
capture the information set used by agents to make decisions that in turn result
in the observed data. This insuﬃcient information problem at step 1 would then
aﬀect the shocks recovered in step 2. To include as much information as possible a
FAVAR is used in step 1. I perform the Forni and Gambetti (2014) test of suﬃcient
information on the shocks recovered as a check that these problems don't aﬀect the
recovery of the news and noise shocks. This procedure tests if the shocks identiﬁed
with the FAVAR are orthogonal to a large set of macroeconomic variables:
vi,t = α(L)Ft + i,t (2.18)
Where vi,t are the shocks identiﬁed from the VAR and i denotes learning,
37All variables in Table 2.2 are stationary. The 3 lag FAVAR passed standard diagnostic tests.
The results of these are provided in the additional appendix
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signal, news and noise. Ft is a vector of principal components. α are the OLS
estimates. The orthogonality test is an F-test that all α's are 0. If the shocks
identiﬁed in (2.15) and (2.17) are uncorrelated with these data then all relevant
information is contained within the VAR model and we can proceed assuming
there is enough information to be able estimate the true structural shocks. This
regression is implemented for 10 principal components with 2 lags. The F-test
results reveal that there is suﬃcient information in the 10 variable FAVAR to
identify the structural shocks (see table 2.3).
Table 2.3: F-test for fundamentalness of shocks (p-values)
Principal components included in regression: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Learning shock 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.98 1.00
Signal shock 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.48 0.68
News shock 0.97 0.97 0.72 0.51 0.60 0.66
Noise shock 0.84 0.79 0.95 0.99 0.39 0.58
2.5.3 Impulse response functions
Figure 2.2: Impulse response functions to learning & signal shocks
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Median impulse response functions to orthogonalised one standard deviation innovations. Conﬁdence intervals are 68%
and 95% from nonparametric bootstrap with 10 000 replications.
The IRFs corresponding to equation (2.15) reveal the impact of learning and
signal shocks on the system (see ﬁgure 2.2 and 2.4 and note that a shock to it is
a learning shock and a shock to xt, a signal shock). All conﬁdence intervals are
68% and 95% from a nonparametric bootstrap procedure with 10 000 replications.
Market expectations of interest rates are a useful predictor of it: a signal shock
is associated with dollar returns exceeding that of the pound of approximately 7
basis points, after 1.5 years. Moreover, Market expectations of interest rates (xt)
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respond positively to learning shocks, with a peak impact around 1.5 years. The
latter can be interpreted, in light of the model in section 2, as an update agents
make to their previous forecasts of interest rates.
A signal shock, indicating higher dollar returns, results in delayed dollar ap-
preciation, as found in empirical studies of exchange rate dynamics (Chari et al.
(2002a); Scholl and Uhlig (2008)) - see ﬁgure 2.4. Agents purchase dollars but not
in suﬃciently large quantities that the entire appreciation takes place on impact -
consistent with underestimating future returns due to uncertainty about informa-
tion conveyed by the signal. In periods following the signal shock realized values
of the interest rate serve to conﬁrm the signal of future rates and continued dollar
purchases induce further appreciation. The appreciation is relatively short lived
lasting 5 months followed by an extended period of appreciation. This relatively
fast appreciation supports the evidence in Kim and Roubini (2000) and Bjornland
(2009) who ﬁnd that the delayed appreciation is much more mild (2-3 months)
than the original Eichenbaum and Evans (1993) ﬁnding of 2-3 years before peak
appreciation occurs.
Figure 2.3: Impulse response functions to news and noise shocks
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Median impulse response functions to orthogonalised one standard deviation innovations. Conﬁdence intervals are 68%
and 95% from nonparametric bootstrap with 10 000 replications.
In contrast to previous VAR studies of exchange rate dynamics (Chari et al.
(2002a); Scholl and Uhlig (2008)), this study distinguishes between a shock to
today's interest rates and how that shock changes market expectations of future
interest rates. The former is the more dominant driver of exchange rate dynamics
on impact. In response to a learning shock the dollar depreciates for 3 months
followed by a protracted period of mild appreciation. Depreciation on impact
contradicts the UIP equation when agents have full information. However, under
limited information, shocks to current interest rates matter primarily as updates
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to previous forecasts of the exchange rate made using the signal. Since agents
respond to signal shocks with delayed dollar appreciation, if the signal shocks
are predominately driven by noise shocks, the appropriate update would be a
correction in the form of a depreciation of the exchange rate.
Figure 2.4: Impulse response functions of ∆st to learning & signal shocks
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Median impulse response functions to orthogonalised one standard deviation innovations. Conﬁdence intervals are 68%
and 95% from nonparametric bootstrap with 10 000 replications.
Indeed, I ﬁnd that while news shocks are important for explaining the interest
rate diﬀerential (see ﬁgure 2.3) as evinced by an estimate of
̂(
σa
σz
)2
= 0.42, noise
shocks drive more of the changes in signal shocks with
̂(
σe
σz
)2
= 0.58. Market
interest rate expectations, xt, respond similarly to both news and noise shocks,
however news has a more persistent impact. This is consistent with agents learning
later whether the jump in the signal was driven by news or noise resulting in
expectations adjusting more quickly to their original position after a noise shock.
The model motivating the identiﬁcation scheme requires that noise shocks don't
inﬂuence the interest rate diﬀerential, it. The response of interest rates to noise
shocks provides some support for this claim in that this claim cannot be rejected
at a 95% level of conﬁdence. However, there is some evidence that noise may
inﬂuence rates at short horizons.
Noise shocks result in delayed dollar appreciation in the ﬁrst 3 months after
the shock followed by a protracted period of mild depreciation (ﬁgure 2.5). The
limited information model provides qualitatively similar results to a noise shock:
appreciation followed by a period of depreciation such that the noise shock has no
long run eﬀect. The restriction that signal shocks don't have long run eﬀects on st,
in combination with the restrictions imposed by the dynamic relationship between
learning shocks and noise shocks is suﬃcient to result in a period of depreciation
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that approximately oﬀsets the appreciation on impact. The interpretation being
that agents are correcting past forecast errors until the impact of those errors is
removed.
These movements in the USD/GBP correspond to periods when current and
future realised interest rates do not motivate any revaluation in the currency and
is evidence of expectational errors driving the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. A
related empirical ﬁnding, documented in Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Burnside
et al. (2011), is crash risk where carry trade pay-oﬀs have a negatively skewed
distribution. In the months following a noise shock, traders start to realise that
the value of the dollar vis-a-vis the pound is based on false expectations of a
higher U.S. relative to U.K. interest rates. The corrections that ensue have the
potential to generate crash-like dynamics if they are large, however I ﬁnd that the
depreciation is relatively mild.
The impact of news shocks is roughly the opposite of noise shocks: a period of
dollar depreciation lasting approximately 3 months followed by mild appreciation.
This depreciation follows from the way agents respond to learning shocks. The
theory predicts, following UIP, an appreciation since in the model agents respond
to learning shocks with an appreciation of the exchange rate in the one period
and AR(1) cases examined. The identiﬁcation imposes that the response to a
news shock is proportional to the news-signal variance ratio
(
σa
σz
)
, resulting in a
small appreciation on impact. There is, however, some evidence of appreciation in
response to a news shock in the case where the proxy for interest rate expectations
is taken from futures contracts (see section 5.6 on robustness).
Figure 2.5: Impulse response functions of ∆st to news & noise shocks
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Median impulse response functions to orthogonalised one standard deviation innovations. Conﬁdence intervals are 68%
and 95% from nonparametric bootstrap with 10 000 replications.
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2.5.4 Variance decomposition
In combination noise and news shocks explain 18% of the forecast error vari-
ance of ∆st- see ﬁgure (2.6). Noise shocks account for around double the variation
in ∆st compared to news shocks (12% vs. 6%). This result is robust to identiﬁca-
tion scheme for noise but not for news - discussed in section 5.6. For this reason
I focus in the role of noise. As agents learn to distinguish reliable from unreliable
signals regarding the future path interest rates, ﬁnding that they responded to
false information leads to a larger response than ﬁnding that this information was
correct. Part of this response is due to the predominance of noise in the signal
(58%) meaning that more corrections take place due to noise relative to news.
Additionally, it is plausible that trading losses are larger in the case of a noise
shock, where the interest rate doesn't respond in the future, than in the case of a
news shock where the interest rate follows a more similar path to that originally
predicted by the signal. With the exception of the shock to the exchange rate
itself, noisy news explains more of the variation in ∆st than other variables in the
model. Individually only fast factor 3, the third leading principal component of
fast moving macro variables, explains more of that variation than noise (which has
its highest factor loadings on Moody's Aaa and Baa corporate bond yields). The
importance of noise relative to news shocks is suggestive as to why the UIP puzzle
is so robust: realised shocks to the interest rate diﬀerential are substantially less
important than expectational errors about those interest rates in driving exchange
rates. This result complements high-frequency studies, such as Clarida and Wald-
man (2008), ﬁnding expectational errors are important in driving exchange rates.
However, it documents such eﬀects at the same frequency at which macroeconomic
data is available and thus shows that expectational errors are important even when
those macro fundamentals have the potential to drive exchange rates.
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Figure 2.6: Variance decomposition of ∆st
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2.5.5 Historical decomposition
The historical decomposition follows Lutkepohl (2011). The contribution of
each structural shock to each observed series is described by:
xt =
t−1∑
i=0
Ψivt−i + At1x0 + At2x−1 + A
t
3x−2 (2.19)
Where xt is the vector of observables in (2.17) and Aj are the coeﬃcients from
the estimated VAR for lag j, vt is the vector of structural shocks. Ψi is the MA
representation for the model at horizon i, in months. The contribution of the
news and noise shocks to the nominal exchange rate are displayed in ﬁgure 2.7.
As equation (2.13) illustrates, to recover noise and news shocks requires future
values of learning and signals shocks. In order to estimate Ψ24, that is a horizon
of 2 years, the last date for which we can recover vt is October 2010.
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Figure 2.7: Historical decomposition of ∆st
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During periods of increased uncertainty about monetary policy, expectational
errors regarding interest rates have been large, resulting in noise shocks having had
a more pronounced impact (see ﬁgure 2.7). The period of 1988-1993 saw the U.K.
central bank rate rise above the U.S. federal funds rate with a depreciation of the
dollar. The recession of 1990 lead to easing of central bank rates in both countries
but with a much faster decline in U.K. rates. Market expectations misread the
speed of the decline in this gap, initially underestimating and then overestimating
the size of the interest rate diﬀerential. This period was also characterised by large
movements in the USD/GBP. Similarly, in 2000, market expectations of rates did
not correctly forecast the easing of U.S. monetary policy relative to that of the U.K.
during the 2001 recession, with expectations that U.S. rates would remain above
U.K. rates (this gap was negative until 2005). The uncertainty associated with
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent unconventional monetary policies
on both sides of the Atlantic saw volatile interest rate expectations. Early 2008
saw a positive gap open up between U.K.-U.S. rates that closed by the end of the
year, however market expectations forecast the opposite then quickly corrected.
The post-crisis uncertainty in monetary policy actions saw expectations that U.K.
rates would rise above U.S. rates around 2009 and 2010, which were not borne
out. The largest news shock on the USD/GBP took place in the last quarter of
2001 with market expectations reliably forecasting the U.K.-U.S. rates gap that
opened up between 2001-2004. A delayed but protracted rally in the U.K. pound
followed.
2.5.6 Robustness
The choice of proxy for market interest rate expectations to measure signal
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shocks plays a central role in the results above. Forward looking variables that
are useful leading indicators of interest rate changes are reasonable candidates.
Robustness of the above results is tested by considering alternative signals of
future interest rates in the form of interest rate futures and uncertainty indices
for the U.S. and U.K (see additional appendix for data description and additional
ﬁgures). In addition I compare the results with the baseline proxy for interest rate
expectations but using a Cholesky recursive identiﬁcation scheme at step 1 of the
estimation. The variables are ordered as in table (2.2). This recursive ordering
follows the convention in the SVAR literature that slower moving macroeconomic
variables such as output and prices are ordered before fast moving expectational
and ﬁnancial variables (see for example Popescu and Smets (2010)). The results
are presented in ﬁgure 2.8.
The results for noise shocks are robust. There is broad agreement across al-
ternative proxies and identiﬁcation schemes as to the timing and direction of the
eﬀects, however they disagree on the size of the impact of noise shocks. The two
alternative proxies indicate more mild appreciation than the baseline case. The
more muted eﬀect is due in part to a lower degree of news content in these proxies,
29% for future rates, and only 5% for the policy uncertainty indices compared to
42% for the baseline proxy of survey expectations.
There is more uncertainty surrounding the response to a news shock. The
alternative proxies and identiﬁcation scheme agree on the direction of the response
with depreciation followed by mild appreciation, however the timing of these eﬀects
and their size is quite variable. The largest deviation is for the case of a Choleski
decomposition at step 1 with only a small appreciation in the ﬁrst and third month
after impact. Unsurprisingly, this translates into a much smaller proportion of the
forecast errors variance of ∆st explained by news: 3% instead of 8%. However, the
contribution of noise shocks remains high, and slightly above the baseline ﬁgure of
12%, at 14% (details of variance decomposition results are given in the additional
appendix).
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Figure 2.8: Impulse response functions for ∆st under alternative proxies for inter-
est rate expectations
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conﬁdence intervals computed from nonparametric bootstrap with 10 000 replications.
The baseline results, with survey expectations as a signal, were also tested with
quarterly data as a check of the inﬂuence of the interpolation procedures used on
the data that is only available at a quarterly frequency. Given the coarseness of
quarterly data only the broad movements in the monthly IRFs is captured (see
ﬁgure 2.9). News shocks exhibit delayed depreciation in the quarters following
impact, followed by a mild appreciation. The size of the depreciation as well as
the presence of a delay are in contrast to the monthly results.The identiﬁcation
scheme imposes that agents respond to news in proportion to the news content of
the signal. This restriction entails appreciation on impact since agents respond to
signal shocks with an appreciation of the USD/GBP. This restriction then inhibits
the 3 month period of depreciation seen in the monthly data, since it is part of the
impact period in quarterly data, leading to a much more mild depreciation overall.
Noise shocks lead to appreciation on impact, followed by a period of depreciation
in line with the monthly results.
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Figure 2.9: Impulse response functions of ∆st to news & noise shocks with quar-
terly data
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper employs the SVAR identiﬁcation scheme of Forni et al. (2013b)
to incorporate noisy news into an imperfect information model of exchange rates.
That scheme uses dynamic rotations to recover structural shocks despite the pres-
ence of noisy news. I employ a factor augmented VAR using survey expectations
of professional forecasters as a signal of future interest rates in the U.S. and the
U.K. The results indicate that news and noise shocks are important drivers of the
USD/GBP exchange rate over the sample period. Noise shocks induce a period
of delayed dollar appreciation in the ﬁrst 3 months after the shock followed by
a protracted period of mild depreciation. The eﬀect of news shocks is the oppo-
site, a period of dollar depreciation lasting approximately 3 months followed by
mild appreciation. These patterns partly accord with the model of exchange rate
determination under imperfect information: both news and noise shocks matter
when a useful signal is available, delayed depreciation followed by an equal and
opposite period of appreciation under noise shocks are found. The model predicts
delayed appreciation following a news shock whereas I ﬁnd delayed appreciation.
However, there is evidence that this appreciation eﬀect is milder when alternative
proxies for interest rate expectations and quarterly data are used.
Variance decompositions show that noisy news is an important driver of the
exchange rate explaining approximately a ﬁfth of its variation. Noise shocks have
a larger eﬀect (12-14%) than news shocks (3-6%). This is partly due to the larger
noise component measured in the proxy for interest rate expectations. These re-
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sults provide further evidence that expectational errors are an important source
of deviations in UIP and relevant to any resolution of the exchange rate discon-
nect puzzle. A historical decomposition of the exchange rate indicates that noise
shocks are more important during periods of changing monetary policy e.g. the
1990 easing and 2001 tightening of U.S. monetary policy and the unconventional
monetary policies surrounding the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008.
Future research could extend this study to developing countries where the carry
trade is known to be signiﬁcant, policy making less transparent and thus where
expectations about future interest rate diﬀerentials are likely to be important
drivers of exchange rate dynamics.
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2.7.1 Limited information model of exchange rate determination
The values of the lag polynomials su(L) and sz(L) relating the value of the st to
learning, ut, and signal, xt, shocks in (2.9) can be found by using the relationship
between it and these shocks:
E[it+j |Ωt] = Etit+j =
{
γc(L)zt + g(L)ut ; j = 0
γ
∑n
k=j ckL
kzt+j +
∑m
k=j gkL
kut+j ; j > 0
(2.20)
Where n is the order of the c(z) and m is the order of g(z), m ≤ n, and the
fact that Etzt+j = Etut+j = 0 ∀j ≥ 1. The value of st is then:
st = −Et
∞∑
j=0
it+j = −s˜z(L)γzt − s˜u(L)ut (2.21)
Where,
s˜z(L) =
n∑
k=1
ck +
n∑
k=1
ckL+
n∑
k=2
ckL
2 + . . .+
n∑
k=n−1
ckL
n−1 + cnLn
s˜u(L) =
m∑
k=1
gk +
m∑
k=1
gkL+
m∑
k=2
gkL
2 + . . .+
m∑
k=m−1
gmL
m−1 + gmLm
The value for the change in the nominal exchange rate is simpler:
∆st = −s˜z(L)(1− L)γzt − s˜u(L)(1− L)ut = sz(L)γzt + su(L)ut (2.22)
Where,
sz(L) =
{
−{c(1)−∑nk=1 ckLk+1} if n ≥ 1
−(1− L)c(1) if n = 0 ; su(L) =
{
−{g(1)−∑nk=1 gkLk+1} if m ≥ 1
−(1− L)g(1) if m = 0
This the solution for ∆st in terms of the learning and signal shocks. To get
the solution in terms of the news and noise shocks, the relationship in (2.11) is
used:
∆st = sz(L)γzt + su(L)ut = sz(L)γ(at + et) + su(L) ((1− γ)b(L)at − γb(L)et)
(2.23)
∆st = sa(L)at + se(L)et (2.24)
Where,
sa(L) = sz(L)γ + (1− γ)su(L)b(L) ; se(L) = γ (sz(L)− su(L)b(L))
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Figure 2.10: Alternative Signals: xt= CME 3-month Eurodollar futures rate- BoE
option implies rates
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and 95% from nonparametric bootstrap with 10 000 replications.
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Figure 2.11: Alternative Signals: xt= Dendy et al. (2013a) index of uncertainty
for U.K. - Baker et al. (2012) index of policy uncertainty for U.S.*
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Figure 2.12: Cumulative IRFs to a noise shock
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Table 2.4: Data for alternative signals
Variable Futures Uncertainty index
US Chicago Mercantile Exchange 3-month Policy uncertainty
Eurodollar Futures index of Baker et al. (2012)
UK Option implies Uncertainty index
interest rates developed by Dendy et al. (2013a)
Source Chicago Mercantile Exchange / policyuncertainty.com / Kindly
Bank of England provided by Haroon Mumtaz
Data January 1988 October 1986
Period to February 2013 to June 2012
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Table 2.5: Variance decomposition: baseline Identiﬁcation at step 1
(a) Learning and signal shocks
Variable Shock
∆st 
yt
t 
pit
t ut zt 
∆st
t
Impact 0.144595 0.678496 3.963307 0.054766 91.525824
3 month 2.114995 0.601733 3.240587 1.629277 56.877952
6 months 2.137271 0.952442 3.249789 1.668006 53.863004
1 year 2.198675 1.265737 3.299717 1.723956 53.250746
5 years 2.238413 1.265301 3.390227 1.840055 53.053080
(b) News and noise shocks
Variable Shock
∆st 
yt
t 
pit
t at et 
∆st
t
Impact 0.150492 0.704001 0.021353 0.030906 95.803199
3 month 2.152754 0.534515 4.449571 10.781678 50.529756
6 months 2.110660 0.825210 5.737792 11.248051 47.041724
1 year 2.143904 1.050302 5.772253 11.438903 46.530301
5 years 2.163538 1.047893 5.770080 11.582672 46.403487
Table 2.6: Variance decomposition: recursive Cholesky identiﬁcation at step 1
(a) Learning and signal shocks
Variable Shock
∆st 
yt
t 
pit
t ut zt 
∆st
t
Impact 0.144595 0.678496 0.725140 0.054766 96.046987
3 month 2.114995 0.601733 1.191180 7.283035 60.101183
6 months 2.137271 0.952442 1.282983 7.408444 56.760523
1 year 2.198675 1.265737 1.350949 7.400722 56.096780
5 years 2.238413 1.265301 1.449604 7.513067 55.891211
(b) News and noise shocks
Variable Shock
∆st 
yt
t 
pit
t at et 
∆st
t
Impact 0.145652 0.683452 0.025241 0.029925 96.748550
3 month 2.024291 0.575927 0.029416 12.370014 57.523657
6 months 1.966225 0.876218 2.415479 13.583384 52.217971
1 year 2.018011 1.161732 2.510423 13.739084 51.487332
5 years 2.042588 1.154608 2.628707 14.298241 51.001644
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Table 2.7: U.K. Macroeconomic data set used to extract principal components
No Mnemonic Name Slow
1 BCCICP02GBM460S Business Tendency Surveys for Construction: Conﬁdence Indicators: 0
2 BSCICP03GBM665S Business Tendency Surveys for Manufacturing: Conﬁdence Indicators: 0
4 CCUSMA02GBM618N National Currency to US Dollar Exchange Rate: Average of Daily Rates 0
5 CSCICP02GBM460S Consumer Opinion Surveys: Conﬁdence Indicators: Composite Indicators: 0
6 CSCICP03GBM665S Consumer Opinion Surveys: Conﬁdence Indicators: Composite Indicators: 0
7 CSESFT02GBM460S Consumer Opinion Surveys: Economic Situation: Future Tendency: 0
8 CSINFT02GBM460S Consumer Opinion Surveys: Consumer Prices: Future Tendency of 0
9 GBRCPIALLMINMEI Consumer Price Index of All Items in the United Kingdom 1
10 GBRCPIENGMINMEI Consumer Price Index: Energy for United Kingdom 1
11 GBRPROINDMISMEI Production of Total Industry in the United Kingdom 1
12 GBRPROMANMISMEI Production in Total Manufacturing for United Kingdom 1
13 GBRRECM OECD based Recession Indicators for the United Kingdom from the Peak 0
14 GBRSARTMISMEI Total Retail Trade in the United Kingdom 1
15 GBRURHARMMDSMEI Harmonized Unemployment Rate: All Persons for United Kingdom 1
16 INTDSRGBM193N Interest Rates, Discount Rate for United Kingdom 0
17 INTGSBGBM193N Interest Rates, Government Securities, Government Bonds for United 0
18 INTGSTGBM193N Interest Rates, Government Securities, Treasury Bills for United 0
21 IRLTLT01GBM156N Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year: Main (Including Benchmark) 0
22 IRSTCI01GBM156N Immediate Rates: Less than 24 Hours: Call Money/Interbank Rate for the 0
23 IRSTLC01GBM156N Immediate Rates: Less than 24 Hours: London Clearing Banks Rate for 0
24 LCEAMN01GBM661S Hourly Earnings: Manufacturing for the United Kingdom 1
25 LCEAMN02GBM661N Weekly Earnings: Manufacturing for the United Kingdom 1
26 LCEAMN02GBM661S Weekly Earnings: Manufacturing for the United Kingdom 1
27 LFHUTTFEGBM647S Total Harmonized Unemployment: Females for the United Kingdom 1
28 LFHUTTMAGBM647S Total Harmonized Unemployment: Males for the United Kingdom 1
29 LMJVTTUVGBM647S Total Unﬁlled Job Vacancies for the United Kingdom 1
30 LRHUTTFEGBM156S Harmonized Unemployment: Total: Females for the United Kingdom 1
31 LRHUTTMAGBM156S Harmonized Unemployment: Total: Males for the United Kingdom 1
32 MABMM201GBM189S M2 for the United Kingdom 0
33 MABMM402GBM189S M4 for the United Kingdom 0
34 MANMM101GBM189S M1 for the United Kingdom 0
35 MYAGM4GBM189S M4 for United Kingdom 0
36 SPASTT01GBM661N Total Share Prices for All Shares for the United Kingdom 0
37 TRESEGGBM052N Total Reserves excluding Gold for United Kingdom 0
38 VALIMPGBM052N Goods, Value of Imports for United Kingdom 1
39 XTEXVA01GBM664S Exports: Value Goods for the United Kingdom 1
40 XTIMVA01GBM664S Imports: Value Goods for the United Kingdom 1
41 XTNTVA01GBM664N Net Trade: Value Goods for the United Kingdom 1
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Table 2.8: U.S. Macroeconomic Data set used to extract principal components
No Mnemonic Name Slow
1 AAA Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield 0
2 AWHI Index of Aggregate Weekly Hours: Production and Nonsupervisory 1
4 BAA Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield 0
5 BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial Banks 1
6 CE16OV Civilian Employment 1
7 CLF16OV Civilian Labor Force 1
8 CPIAUCSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items 1
9 CPIMEDSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Medical Care 1
10 CPITRNSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Transportation 1
11 CPIULFSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food 1
12 EXCAUS Canada / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate 0
13 EXJPUS Japan / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate 0
14 EXSZUS Switzerland / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate 0
15 FEDFUNDS Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate 0
16 GS1 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 0
17 GS10 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 0
18 GS5 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 0
21 HOUST Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started 0
22 INDPRO Industrial Production Index 1
23 M1SL M1 Money Stock 0
24 M2REAL Real M2 Money Stock 0
25 M2SL M2 Money Stock 0
26 NAPM ISM Manufacturing: PMI Composite Index 0
27 NAPMEI ISM Manufacturing: Employment Index 0
28 NAPMII ISM Manufacturing: Inventories Index 0
29 NAPMNOI ISM Manufacturing: New Orders Index 0
30 NAPMPI ISM Manufacturing: Production Index 0
31 NAPMSDI ISM Manufacturing: Supplier Deliveries Index 0
32 PAYEMS All Employees: Total nonfarm 0
33 PCE Personal Consumption Expenditures 1
34 PERMIT New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits 0
35 PPIFGS Producer Price Index: Finished Goods 1
36 PPIITM Producer Price Index: Intermediate Materials: Supplies & Components 1
37 RPI Real Personal Income 1
38 TB6MS 6-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate 0
39 TCU Capacity Utilization: Total Industry 0
40 TOTRESNS Total Reserves of Depository Institutions 0
41 UEMP27OV Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over 1
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Table 2.9: U.S. Macroeconomic Data set used to extract principal components
No Mnemonic Name Slow
42 UEMP5TO14 Civilians Unemployed for 5-14 Weeks 1
43 UEMPLT5 Civilians Unemployed - Less Than 5 Weeks 1
44 UEMPMEAN Average (Mean) Duration of Unemployment 1
45 UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate 1
46 USCONS All Employees: Construction 1
47 USFIRE All Employees: Financial Activities 1
48 USGOOD All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries 1
49 USGOVT All Employees: Government 1
50 USTPU All Employees: Trade, Transportation & Utilities 1
51 USTRADE All Employees: Retail Trade 1
52 USWTRADE All Employees: Wholesale Trade 1
53 SP500 S&P 500 Stock Price Index 0
54 DJIA Dow Jones Industrial Average 0
Table 2.10: Autocorrelation of residuals
Equation residual yt pit sf1 it xt
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.012259 2.110185 2.030214 2.005395 1.967177
p-value 0.611867 0.685519 0.733761 0.567753 0.353702
Equation residual ff1 ff2 ff3 ff4 ∆st
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.967102 2.026991 2.004667 2.076374 1.994003
p-value 0.353338 0.711270 0.563164 0.928336 0.498091
The null of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected for all equations in the VAR
Table 2.11: Unit root test of VAR residuals
Equation residual yt pit sf1 it xt
Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic -17.831912 -18.689707 -17.993610 -17.938773 -17.377156
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Equation residual ff1 ff2 ff3 ff4 ∆st
Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic -17.377212 -17.942401 -17.706491 -18.354463 -17.616157
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for all equations in the VAR
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Chapter 3
Macroeconomic Uncertainty in
South Africa
Abstract
This paper develops a new index of economic uncertainty for South Africa for
the period 1990-2014 and analyses the macroeconomic impact of changes in this
measure. The index is constructed from three sources: (1) Disagreement among
professional forecasters about macroeconomic conditions using novel data from a
forecasting competition run by a national newspaper, (2) a count of international
and local newspaper articles discussing economic uncertainty in South Africa and
(3) mentions of uncertainty in the quarterly economic review of the South African
Reserve Bank. The index shows high levels of uncertainty around the period of
democratic transition in 1992-4, the large depreciation of the currency in 2001
and the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. The uncertainty index is a leading indicator of
a recession. An unanticipated increase in the index is associated with a fall in
GDP, investment, industrial production and private sector employment. Contrary
to evidence for the U.S.A and U.K., uncertainty shocks are inﬂationary. These
results are robust to controlling for global shocks (VIX index), consumer conﬁdence
and a measure of ﬁnancial stress.
Keywords: economic uncertainty, business cycles, inﬂation, South Africa.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D80, E32, E31, E66, N17.
3.1 Introduction
The Great Recession has renewed interest in the question of the sources of
business cycle ﬂuctuations. Traditional sources of ﬂuctuations, such as technology
and labour supply shocks, are less plausible explanations of this episode than of
previous recessions. I study a new driver proposed by Baker and Bloom (2013):
ﬂuctuations in uncertainty. These authors develop a proxy for economic policy
uncertainty based on news articles discussing policy uncertainty, the number of
federal taxes set to expire and disagreement among professional forecasters over
the future values of government purchases and inﬂation. They show, using a vector
autoregression, that an increase in their proxy equivalent to the rise seen during
the ﬁnancial crisis is associated with a loss of around 2 million jobs and a decline
in industrial production of 2.5% for the U.S.A. Moreover, Bloom (2009) show that
uncertainty rises by around 50% during a typical U.S. recession. Studies following
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Baker and Bloom (2013) have provided similar evidence that uncertainty shocks
are important drivers of the business cycle, e.g. Dendy et al. (2013b) for the U.K.
Despite some cross-country work relating uncertainty to growth by Baker and
Bloom (2013), there is little evidence of the eﬀects of such proxies for economic
uncertainty for developing countries. Given that developing countries experi-
ence much higher levels of realised volatility than developed nations (Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2011b) and Bloom (2014)) it is plausible that ﬂuctuations in
uncertainty are important drivers of business cycles in these regions. It has been
argued by Leduc and Liu (2012) that shocks to uncertainty have a central role to
play in understanding business cycles as they are prototypical aggregate demand
shocks, with lower output and inﬂation. However, recent papers by Popescu and
Smets (2010) and Gilchrist et al. (2013a) have challenged the relevance of uncer-
tainty shocks once their correlation with credit spreads is accounted for, suggesting
that uncertainty shocks only matter when acting through a ﬁnancial channel. Ex-
tending studies of uncertainty beyond developed nations can help disentangle the
eﬀects of ﬁnancial shocks from uncertainty shocks. During the Great Recession
many developing countries experienced increases in uncertainty, as the impact of a
large recession in trading partner countries took hold, yet they did not experience
the same levels of ﬁnancial stress and instability as in the developed world.
This paper makes two contributes to this literature. Firstly, it extends the
evidence that uncertainty shocks generate drops in real activity to a developing
country. Secondly, it provides evidence that uncertainty shocks have real eﬀects
even when controlling for ﬁnancial stress (credit spreads).
I construct an index of economic uncertainty following Dendy et al. (2013b) for
the period 1990-2014. The index is constructed from three sources: (1) Disagree-
ment among professional forecasters about macroeconomic conditions using novel
data from a forecasting competition run by a national newspaper, (2) a count
of international and local newspaper articles discussing economic uncertainty in
South Africa and (3) mentions of uncertainty in the quarterly economic review
of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). The index is positively correlated
with other proxies for uncertainty, i.e. realised and option implied volatility of the
stock market. The index shows high levels of uncertainty around the period of
democratic transition in 1992-4, the large depreciation of the currency in 2001 as
well as the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008.
To measure the impact of uncertainty shocks I use a structural VAR. The
results show that economic uncertainty is a leading indicator of a recession in South
Africa. An unanticipated increase in the index is associated with a fall in GDP,
investment, industrial production, capital inﬂows and private sector employment.
Contrary to evidence for the U.S.A. and U.K., uncertainty shocks are inﬂationary.
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I show that this result is robust to the inclusion of a proxy for credit spreads as
well as alternative methods of construction for the index.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.1 reviews the
literature on uncertainty shocks. Section 2 describes the construction of the index
and compares it to alternative proxies in South Africa. Section 3 presents the
VAR results and robustness checks and section 5 concludes.
3.1.1 Literature
Why should uncertainty matter? There are (at least) three broad reasons
identiﬁed in the literature: real options, risk aversion and growth options eﬀects
(Bloom (2014)).
The real options approach to uncertainty (Bernanke (1983)) envisages that
ﬁrms face a number of projects which they may pause if prospects diminish. How-
ever, for this to have macroeconomic eﬀects a number of preconditions are needed:
ﬁrms must be subject to ﬁxed costs or partially irreversabilities in investment, be
able to wait to bring its products to market (e.g. not in a patent race with other
ﬁrms) and operate in an environment where today's investment decision aﬀects to-
morrows actions e.g. through increasing-returns-to-scale technology. These eﬀects
have the potential to weaken productivity-enhancing reallocation of resources as
productive ﬁrms expand less and unproductive ﬁrms contract less as both wait
for uncertainty to clear. This can generate pro-cyclical productivity as in Bloom
et al. (2012) and link these shocks to the business cycle.
Greater uncertainty directly increases risk premia if investors are risk averse
and will increase the probability of default among lenders, leading to higher default
premia. An important channel through which uncertainty operates is its ability
to generate and amplify ﬁnancial stress (Arellanon et al. (2012); Christiano et al.
(2014); Gilchrist et al. (2013a)). Risk averse households respond with precaution-
ary savings which is contractionary in the short run but may stimulate long run
growth through. For small open economies much of this savings ﬂows abroad lead-
ing to large reductions in domestic demand (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011b)).
If nominal rigidities are strong, the drop in demand will not be met with suﬃ-
ciently reduced prices leading to a recession even in large economies (Leduc and
Liu (2012); Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011a)).
It is not clear why an increase in uncertainty should be interpreted always as
equivalent to bad news. Growth options refer to the idea that entrepreneurs can
only lose their investment but the upside of an increase in potential outcomes is
unbounded. Thus uncertainty creates call option eﬀects. However, the empirical
literature has consistently found non-positive responses to increases in uncertainty
on a macroeconomic level. A potential reason for the bad news interpretation of
increased uncertainty is that agents are ambiguity averse. Such agents cannot
assign a probability distribution over the future and respond by assuming the
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worst-case-scenario of the possible distributions they consider (Ilut and Schneider
(2014)). Thus any increase in the possible range of outcomes acts only to worsen
expectations of the future.
The large increases in uncertainty during the 2008 recession has stimulated
research into better proxies to measure uncertainty. These focus on macroecono-
metric estimates of time varying volatility, cross-sectional dispersion of ﬁrms earn-
ings or productivity, and direct measures of perceived uncertainty in the form of
forecast distributions from surveys of professional forecasters.
The literature developing proxies for uncertainty was initiated by Bloom (2009)
who uses large shifts in U.S. stock market volatility as a proxy for exogenous
changes in uncertainty. He ﬁnds this measure is a leading indicator for declines
in industrial output and employment with a short recessionary eﬀect and a sub-
sequent period of recovery and positive catch-up growth. This pattern is explained
as due to drops in real activity as investment and hiring plans are paused in re-
sponse to higher uncertainty but can be quickly rekindled as this uncertainty
dissipates. Baker et al. (2012) develop an economic policy uncertainty index for
the U.S. comprised of a a frequency count of news stories on uncertainty about
the economy or ﬁscal and monetary policy, the number and revenue impact of
scheduled federal taxes set to expire, and the extent of disagreement among eco-
nomic forecasters over future government purchases and future inﬂation. Dendy
et al. (2013b) pursue a similar methodology for the U.K. focusing on economic
rather than policy uncertainty with an index composed of a newspaper search,
variation in forecasts of economic variables and mentions of uncertainty in the
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) minutes and Financial Sta-
bility Reports (FSRs). Both studies ﬁnd similar results to Bloom's original study,
although without the positive growth catch-up phase, with large negative real
eﬀects on employment and industrial production which peak after 1 year to 18
months, respectively, after the shock.
Studies that make exclusive use of forecaster disagreement from surveys of
professional forecasters include Dovern et al. (2012), who ﬁnd that these measures
matter more for nominal than real variables in the G7, Bachmann et al. (2013),
who use German business climate surveys and ﬁnd signiﬁcant (but short lived) de-
cline in production, and Leduc and Liu (2012) who measure perceived uncertainty
directly as the fraction of respondents in surveys of businesses and consumers in-
dicating uncertainty about the future as a factor limiting their spending plans
(cars for consumers or capital expenditure for ﬁrms). The latter ﬁnd evidence
that uncertainty shocks are prototypical aggregate demand shocks with delayed
declines in inﬂation, employment and short term interest rates.
Other studies aim to measure the role of uncertainty through econometric
techniques to estimate the time varying volatility of macroeconomic time series.
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Mumtaz and Zanetti (2013), studying U.S. data, augment a standard SVAR model
to allow for time variation in the volatility of identiﬁed monetary policy shocks
where the level of endogenous variable included in the VAR and this time varying
volatility dynamically interact. They ﬁnd similar results to Leduc and Liu (2012)
with a demand shock like response of falling output, interest rates and inﬂation.
Mumtaz and Surico (2013) extended this to measures of ﬁscal policy uncertainty
using the same methodology. They ﬁnd that uncertainty about public debt sus-
tainability, government spending and tax changes all have signiﬁcant contraction-
ary eﬀects on GDP. Using a more structural econometric approach Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2011a) estimate volatility of government spending and taxes and
feed this series of volatility estimates into a general equilibrium model ﬁnding
similar contractionary patters for real variables, however, their model indicates
that ﬁscal uncertainty shocks have potentially inﬂationary eﬀects. Using a similar
methodology, Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011b), study time-varying volatility in
the real interest rates of four emerging small open economies: Argentina, Ecuador,
Venezuela, and Brazil. They ﬁnd that real interest rate volatility leads to a fall
in output, consumption, investment, and hours worked. A recent alternative eco-
nometric approach pursued by Jurado et al. (2015) measures macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial uncertainty as the conditional variance of the unforecastable component
common to a large number of ﬁrm-level, macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables.
This approach indicates uncertainty episodes are less common than the above
proxies tend to indicate but that when spikes in uncertainty do occur they are
larger and more persistent. These authors ﬁnd the real macroeconomic eﬀects of
their measure of uncertainty lead to a large and protracted drop in real activity
(production, hours, employment) without the growth catch-up period found in
Bloom (2009). Their results do agree with the results of Bloom (2009); Bloom
et al. (2012) in ﬁnding a countercyclical pattern to cross-sectional dispersion in
ﬁrm earnings and productivity however they only ﬁnd a recessionary eﬀect for an
increase in productivity dispersion.
The above results have been challenged by Popescu and Smets (2010) and
Gilchrist et al. (2013a), who argue that once a measure of ﬁnancial stress, as
proxied by credit spreads, is included in these regressions the independent role
of uncertainty shocks becomes minimal. Popescu and Smets (2010), studying
German data, use a VAR with forecaster dispersion as a proxy for uncertainty and
credit spreads (corporate and mortgage bond rates to government bonds rates) as
a measure of ﬁnancial stress. They show that the real eﬀects of ﬁnancial stress
are much larger and persistent than those of uncertainty with lower inﬂation and
GDP, and higher unemployment. In contrast to the ﬁndings above, they ﬁnd
uncertainty shocks are inﬂationary once ﬁnancial stress is controlled for. Similarly,
Gilchrist et al. (2013a) seek to discriminate between ﬁnancial and uncertainty
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shocks role in the business cycle. Their identiﬁcation procedure uses a penalty
function method of Uhlig (2005) to (1) extract the shock explaining the largest
forecast error variance of corporate credit spreads (adjusted for predictable default)
then (2) do the same for an uncertainty (realised volatility of cross-sectional stock
market returns) conditional on the ﬁnancial shock identiﬁed in the ﬁrst step. They
repeat this but reversing the order of shocks. The ﬁrst identiﬁcation strategy
makes it hard for uncertainty shocks to matter, but it extracts the most powerful
ﬁnancial shock in the system and the second strategy delivers the most powerful
uncertainty shock by minimizing the role played by ﬁnancial shocks. They ﬁnd that
ﬁnancial shocks are important drivers of the business cycle but that uncertainty
shocks are not unless they have their eﬀect through a ﬁnancial channel i.e. by
tightening credit conditions.
3.2 Measuring macroeconomic uncertainty
I construct a index of economic uncertainty following Dendy et al. (2013b) for
the period 1990-2014. The index is constructed from three sources: (1) Disagree-
ment among professional forecasters about macroeconomic conditions, (2) a count
of international and local newspaper articles discussing economic uncertainty in
South Africa and (3) mentions of uncertainty in the quarterly economic review of
the SARB.
Figure 3.1: Forecaster Disagreement
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Source: Die Beeld Newspaper Economist of the Year Competitions. Normalised standard deviation of
forecasts across forecasters. Normalised to have a mean and standard of 100 for each variable for the
sample period of 1990-2014.
3.2.1 Forecaster disagreement
I use a novel data source to capture forecaster disagreement. Since 1988 the
South African national daily newspaper Die Beeld has run a forecasting compet-
ition for professional forecasters from the private and public sector. Contestants
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are asked to make nowcasts (estimates of current year) and forecasts (estimates
for next year) for real GDP growth, CPI inﬂation, the short term interest rate,
gold price, Rand/Dollar exchange rate and the level of current account. The news-
paper reports both the mean and standard deviation of across forecasters. I use
the reported standard deviation for nowcasts across forecasters as my measure of
forecaster disagreement. I use nowcasts since one year ahead forecasts are only
available for GDP and CPI from 1996. Gaps in availability of the monthly pub-
lication of this data is overcome by aggregating to quarterly through averaging.
Unfortunately there remain gaps in this data for 1990 and 1993Q4-1995Q4. To
make these comparable I standardise each series to have a mean and standard
deviation of 100: yq = 100 + 100 (xq − x) /σx . Where xq is the quarterly data, yq
is the standardised value; x is the mean and σx the standard deviation calculated
from the entire sample.
Forecaster disagreement is higher across all variables during the 2008 recession
with the most pronounced response for GDP, CPI inﬂation and the Gold Price (see
ﬁgure 3.1). The Asian crisis of 1999 and subsequent ﬁnancial distress associated
with Russia's default on its sovereign debt along with the collapse of Long Term
Capital Management had a contagion eﬀect on the Rand with a substantial de-
preciation in 2001. This appears to introduce greater exchange rate and inﬂation
uncertainty in the next 5 years following this episode. While domestic uncertainty
(that over GDP, Interest rates and CPI) has decreased after the great recession,
external uncertainty (Gold Price, Exchange Rate, Current Account) remains el-
evated. The pattern in uncertainty in the gold price and current account mimics
the levels of these variables38.
Two alternative methods of construction were explored. The ﬁrst considered
use of forecasts instead of nowcast estimates which resulted in a highly similar
series (see appendix) and almost no change in the ﬁnal index to measure uncer-
tainty. The second was using the adjustment of Dovern et al. (2012) to convert
the ﬁxed event forecasts in the data to approximate ﬁxed horizon forecasts which
are better suited to the notion of uncertainty. Fixed event forecasts are forecast
made regarding a ﬁxed event, such as GDP growth in 1992 and forecasters are
surveyed as they approach this date. Fixed horizon forecasts are when forecasters
give an estimate a ﬁxed time horizon away e.g. forecasters give their estimate for
GDP growth 1 year from the time the are surveyed regardless of when they are
surveyed. I describe the approximation in the appendix and show that the results
are very similar.
38The gold price rose from lows of around $300 in the early 2000s to over $1750 in 2011, falling
thereafter back down to $1250 by the end of 2014. Similarly the current account to GDP ratio
has deteriorated from a surplus of in the early 1990s to a consistent deﬁcit since with a declining
trend (around -5% in 2014). Similar depreciation trend is relevant for the Rand with a spike in
2001 and 2009.
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3.2.2 News and policy uncertainty
To measure economic uncertainty by news stories I use the Nexis U.K. database
of national and international newspapers. I searched for stories based on inclusion
of the word stem econ* within 10 words of the stem uncert* within 10 words of
South Africa39. An informal audit of these results showed that the stories were, in
general, about economic uncertainty in South Africa rather than unrelated stories
that happen to contain these words. Since the number of articles produced and
archived varies over time I normalise the number of articles found in the previous
step by the number of articles found that include the term today within 10 words
of South Africa. This is similar to the normalisation used in Baker et al. (2012)
where they normalise by the number of articles in the database each month and
Dendy et al. (2013b) who normalise by the use of the key word the for the U.K.
newspapers in their archive. This series is normalised to have a mean and standard
deviation of 100 as before.
The results show peaks in uncertainty around 1992Q2,1996Q1, 1999Q1, 2003,
2008Q3 and 2010Q1 (see ﬁgure 3.2). The spike in 1992Q2 relates to news about
political and economic change surrounding the end of Apartheid and its potential
to extend the protracted recession that began 1989Q4. The rise in 1996Q1 relates
to EU/South African free trade area talks, 1999Q1 relates to sharp movement in s
the Rand, 2003 relates to stagﬂation induced by the large and persistent exchange
rate depreciation in 2001. The spike in 2008Q3 relates to political uncertainty
surrounding the resignation of President Thabo Mbeki and potential corruption
charges for the leading candidate to succeed him, Jacob Zuma; as well as con-
cerns about global ﬁnancial developments aﬀecting the domestic economy. News
in 2010Q1 was dominated by discussion relating to economic recovery after the
2008 global ﬁnancial crisis, further deterioration of neighbouring Zimbabwe and
concerns over political stability under President Jacob Zuma.
Uncertainty from the perspective of policy makers is measured by searching
for mentions of the word stem uncert* in the Quarterly Economic Review found
in the Quarterly Bulletin of the SARB for 1990-2014. Although published by
the monetary authority, this review is broad and covers a range of developments
including domestic production, labour markets, housing markets, foreign trade
and payments, ﬁnancial markets and public ﬁnance40. This is done using the free
text analysis software AntConc (Anthony (2014)). This series is normalised to
have a mean and standard deviation of 100 as before.
Periods of outstanding uncertainty are 1994Q2, 1996, 2002Q1, 2008Q2 and the
period from 2011Q2 onward (see ﬁgure 3.1). April 1994 saw the ﬁrst democratic
39The use of the stem econ* means that terms like uncertain, uncertainty,uncertainties, etc.
will all be included in the search.
40Fiscal policy documents, such as the annual budget, and analysis from international organ-
isations, such as the IMF Article IV country reports, are not available at the required frequency
(quarterly) and for the sample period.
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elections in South Africa. Unsurprisingly, policy makers policy were unsure of
the political and regulatory environment to follow. 1996 saw elevated levels of
turbulence in the demand for South African sovereign bonds, leading to a SARB
injection of liquidity by taking 2/3 of a Treasury Bill tender in May. Political un-
certainty and labour market unrest helped amplify these concerns leading to bond
yield and exchange rate volatility. Uncertainties surrounding the U.S recession,
domestic equity market volatility and the large depreciation of the currency are
responsible for the peak in 2002Q1. 2008Q2 relates to concerns due to the global
ﬁnancial criss. The period after 2011 is driven by the chicanery around raising the
U.S. federal debt ceiling, the earthquake in Japan, continued uncertainty regard-
ing the stability of the Euro and concerns over the impact of rising interest rates
in the U.S..
Figure 3.2: News and policy based measures of uncertainty
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(b) Policy based measure of uncertainty
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Sources: Nexis U.K. newspaper archive (News) , SARB Quarterly Bulletins (Policy). The News index is
a count of articles with the word stem econ* within 10 words of the stem uncert* within 10 words of
South Africa for international and South African Newspapers normalised by a count of articles with the
term today within 10 words of South Africa. The policy index is a count of the word stem uncert* in
the Quarterly Economic Review found in the Quarterly Bulletin of the SARB. Both series are normalised
to have a mean and standard deviation of 100.
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3.2.3 Macroeconomic uncertainty index
I construct 2 indices of macroeconomic uncertainty. The ﬁrst uses an equally
weighted average of the (standardised) values of forecaster disagreement over GDP,
CPI and interest rates and the second, disagreement over the gold price, exchange
rate and the current account balance. The ﬁrst captures domestic issues, the
second has more focus on open economy developments. Each index is an equally
weighted average of forecaster disagreement with the (standardised) values of news
uncertainty and policy uncertainty mentioned above (see ﬁgure 3.3). I label the
index with domestic focus SAUI and the open economy analogue SAUIO.
Figure 3.3: Macroeconomic Uncertainty Indices
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SAUI is an equally weighted average of the normalised values of (1) forecaster disagreement over GDP,
CPI and interest rates; (2) News index; (3) Policy index. SAUIO is identical except the ﬁrst term is (1)
forecaster disagreement over the gold price, exchange rate and the current account balance
The two peak periods of uncertainty eﬀectively identify the key drivers of un-
certainty in the ﬁrst half and second half of the 1990-2014 period. The ﬁrst peak
in 1994, and the period of the 1990s, is principally driven by political uncertainty.
The second peak around the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis is typical of the period
after 2000 when developments in global economy have a contagion eﬀect on South
Africa. The 1990s was the most politically turbulent in modern South African his-
tory with the unbanning of political organisations, the release of political prisoners
along with violent political unrest e.g. around the negotiations to end Apartheid
at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). The period after
2000 saw a depreciation of the currency of almost 50% from 2000 to 2002 due to
capital ﬂight associated with destabilising eﬀects of the earlier Asian crisis and
collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 2000. The period of 2002-2007
saw the highest levels of post-Apartheid GDP growth, oﬀ high consumption levels
and strong house price growth that ended with the contagion eﬀects of the global
ﬁnancial crisis in 2008. Continued external uncertainty relating to the protracted
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recovery from the episode, especially surrounding the eurozone (South Africa's
largest trading partner) and the potentially destabilising eﬀects of the large in-
terest rate diﬀerential with developed markets closing when central banks raise
base rates above zero for the ﬁrst time in half a decade. Due to little independent
variation in the two indices, I use the SAUI index for the empirical section below.
This measure of uncertainty accords well with other proxies for uncertainty:
realised daily volatility of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Share index (ALS-
IVOL) and a measure of option implied volatility based on the 40 largest shares by
market value on the JSE index (SAVIT40) - see ﬁgure 3.4. The SAUI is correlated
with US uncertainty indices but still exhibits independent variation (see ﬁgure
3.5). The SAUI has a correlation of 45% with the VIX and 65% with the measure
put forward by Jurado et al. (2015). However, those indices are dominated by 2008
ﬁnancial crisis whereas the SAUI index captures shocks of comparable magnitude
in the 1990s period.
Figure 3.4: Comparison with realised and implied stock market volatility
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Sources: Bloomberg, author's calculations. SAUI is the index described in section 2.3, ALSIVOL is the
standard deviation of the daily JSE All Share index over each quarter, SAVIT40 is a weighted average
of call and put options on JSE Top 40 (i.e. the 40 largest shares on the JSE All Share index) expiring
within 3 months and is thus a measure of expected equity market volatility. All series are normalised to
have mean and standard deviation of 100.
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Figure 3.5: Comparison to Uncertainty indices for the U.S.
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Sources: Macrobond, author's calculations. SAUI is the index described in section 2.3. The JLN index
is taken from Jurado et al. (2015)
3.3 Impact of uncertainty shocks
3.3.1 VAR model
The benchmark model is given below:
Yt = A0 + B(L)Yt−1 + et
Where B(L) is a matrix lag polynomial of coeﬃcients estimated with Bayesian
methods and et ∼ N (0,Σ). The estimation implements a Normal Wishart prior
using dummy observations following Banbura et al. (2010). The variables included
in the matrix Yt are private sector employment rate, log of Industrial production,
log of investment, log of GDP, log of the CPI index, log of the JSE All Share
Index, 10 year government bond yield, repurchase rate of the Reserve Bank and
the SAUI index. The sample is quarterly and runs from 1990 to 2013Q4. The
Schwarz information criteria calls for only 2 lag however I extend this to a lag lent
of 3 is based on tests of no serial correlation and normality of the error term et.
To identify the structural shocks I use a Cholesky decomposition of Σˆ using
a ordering as described above. This identiﬁcation assumption follows the conven-
tion in the VAR literature of assuming with the slower moving macro variables
are ordered before fast moving ﬁnancial variables (for example Popescu and Smets
(2010)). The macro bloc is ordered with quantities ﬁrst and the price level after-
wards. I order uncertainty last since it is predominately a measure of agents ex-
pectations (which can change very quickly). The results are robust to alternative
orderings (see below).
An unanticipated rise in the uncertainty index is associated with a decline in
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output, employment, asset prices and investment in the future (see ﬁgure 3.6).
The eﬀects are most marked for industrial production and investment with a peak
fall in industrial production of almost 4%. These results are broadly in line with
the ﬁndings in the literature where a strong response of industrial production to
uncertainty (Dendy et al. (2013b); Leduc and Liu (2012); Baker et al. (2012)).
Similarly the strong response of investment accords with the real options view of
uncertainty whereby higher levels of uncertainty have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on invest-
ment decisions of ﬁrms (Bernanke (1983); Bloom (2009); Bloom et al. (2012)). The
eﬀects on GDP and the employment rate are more moderate but still signiﬁcant
with a peak impact of 1.2% and 1.9% after a year and a half, respectively. Asset
prices respond with a peak decline of around 13% after a year. Similar negative
responses to asset prices have been found for the U.K., although with much less
persistence (Dendy et al. (2013b)). In contrast to the studies of (Leduc and Liu
(2012)) for the U.S. who ﬁnd that uncertainty shocks are deﬂationary, I ﬁnd that
they are associated with 1% increase in the price level after about 1 year. This res-
ult accords with the ﬁnding of Klein (2011 - IMF) that mark-ups are, contrary to
international experience, countercyclical in South Africa. Variance decompositions
show that almost half of the forecast error variance (43%) of industrial production
is explained by ﬂuctuations in uncertainty (ﬁgure 3.7). Similarly, the index is an
important component of the variance of the stock market and investment as well
as GDP.
Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses to SAUI
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3.3.2 Robustness
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These results extend the ﬁndings for developed nations that uncertainty shocks
are an important source of business cycle ﬂuctuations. In order to test the robust-
ness of these results I augment the VAR above to include consumer conﬁdence and
a measure of the ﬁnancial stress, in the form of a bank lending credit spread. The
ﬁrst robustness check follows Baker et al. (2012), who include consumer conﬁdence
in order to disentangle uncertainty (a mean-preserving increase in the variance of
macro variables) from that of bad news (a change in the mean). Consumer con-
ﬁdence is the OECD consumer opinion survey composite indicator. The second
is motivated by the recent debate in the literature that the eﬀects of uncertainty
shocks are primarily through their impact on ﬁnancial conditions, i.e. higher un-
certainty matters because it raises risk levels and credit spreads, but have little
eﬀect in themselves. Gilchrist et al. (2013b), studying the U.S., and Popescu
and Smets (2010), looking at German data, ﬁnd that once credit conditions are
controlled for the impact of uncertainty shocks on the real economy is relatively
modest. Those authors used the spread of corporate to government bond yields
as a proxy for ﬁnancial stress.
Figure 3.7: Contribution of SAUI to Forecast Error Variance
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Sample is from 1990Q1-2013Q3. Cholesky ordering is the baseline: (1) Private Employment Rate (2)
log(Industrial Production) (3) log(Investment) (4) log(GDP) (5) log(CPI) (6) log(All Share Index) (7)
10 Year Government Bond Yield (8) Repo Rate (9) Uncertainty Index SAUI
Unfortunately bond market in South Africa is dominated by government in-
struments, and features only a small number of (mostly state owned) ﬁrms (Hassan
(2013)). Thus using a market based measure of corporate spreads would be un-
desirable. Instead I construct a measure of the bank lending conditions facing
ﬁrms as the spread on new ﬁxed-rate instalment sale credit over the 3 month Ne-
gotiable Certiﬁcate of Deposit rate at banks. The ﬁrst measures credit conditions
facing ﬁrms and households seeking credit on movable property and the second is
closely tied to the South African Benchmark Overnight Rate (SABOR) used for
interbank lending, however a longer series is available for the Negotiable Certiﬁcate
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of Deposit (NCD) rate. Both series are available from the SARB.
Figure 3.8: Uncertainty, Consumer Conﬁdence and Credit Spreads
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Source: Authors calculations, SARB, FRED database of St. Louis Federal Reserve. Consumer conﬁdence
is the OECD consumer opinion survey composite indicator from FRED (CSCICP02ZAQ460N). Credit
Spread is the diﬀerence between the bank lending rate on new ﬁxed-rate instalment sale credit (KBP1181)
less the NCD rate (KBP1411).
Consumer conﬁdence and uncertainty are negatively correlated (see ﬁgure 3.8).
Consumer conﬁdence improves during the boom years of the early 2000s and col-
lapses in 2008 as the ﬁnancial crisis hits, uncertainty follows the inverse pattern.
Credit spreads are weakly positively correlated with uncertainty (28%) with gen-
erally lower spreads during the boom years and a spike in rates as the global
ﬁnancial crisis hits South Africa. Interestingly this spike only happens about a
year after the spikes in uncertainty and consumer conﬁdence. It took about a year
for the contagion eﬀects of dislocation in credit markets in the U.S. and Europe to
translate into a recession in South Africa. This is reﬂected in lending conditions.
This timing is helpful to distinguish the role of uncertainty from ﬁnancial stress
in that these two were not as highly correlated as in the markets were the global
ﬁnancial crisis originated.
The baseline results are robust to the inclusion of both consumer conﬁdence
and the credit spread measure (see ﬁgure 3.9)41. The size of the eﬀects of uncer-
tainty on industrial production, GDP and investment are moderated and there is
evidence of a period of lower prices after about 2 years following the initial inﬂa-
tionary period. This result is noteworthy as, for example, Bachmann et al. (2013)
ﬁnds that eﬀects of uncertainty shocks are not robust to the inclusion of consumer
41For each robustness exercise presented here IRFs with credible sets are available in the
appendix
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conﬁdence. Moreover, the evidence in developed markets that uncertainty only
matters as a proxy for ﬁnancial stress is not supported by these ﬁndings.
The series for forecaster disagreement has missing data for 1992,1994 and 1995.
Thus the uncertainty index is comprised only of news and policy uncertainty for
these years. To check the robustness of the results to this I repeat the baseline
regressions for 1996-2013. The results are very similar to the case with the credit
spread and consumer conﬁdence included in the VAR.The uncertainty index for
South Africa tends to rise during times of global uncertainty in addition to do-
mestic developments (see ﬁgure 3.3). Thus it may be that much of the the aﬀects
found are due to correlation with global uncertainty shocks. To control for this
I include the VIX index (ordered before the South Africa uncertainty index to
reﬂect that SAUI will respond to the VIX on impact but not vice versa). The res-
ults broadly agree with the baseline, with some further, but moderate, evidence
for deﬂation.
Figure 3.9: Robustness of Impulse Responses to SAUI
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The baseline results are robust to Cholesky ordering of the shocks, however
results are more sensitive to identiﬁcation with sign restrictions (see ﬁgure 3.10).
I impose short run sign restrictions following previous ﬁndings for uncertainty
shocks in literature cited above but leave the response of inﬂation and the repo
(which will be strongly correlated with inﬂation) unrestricted (see table 3.1). The
results for GDP, investment and share prices are broadly similar. The eﬀects for
inﬂation, industrial production and employment are more muted, somewhat in-line
with the results from long run restrictions. Moreover, I ﬁnd that the inﬂationary
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Table 3.1: Sign restrictions
Employment IPI Inv GDP CPI ALSI Gov Bond Repo SAUI
- - - - ? - + ? +
eﬀect is no longer signiﬁcant.
Figure 3.10: Robustness of Impulse Responses to SAUI
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3.4 Discussion of results
The results discussed above generally indicate inﬂation following an uncer-
tainty shock. Here I discuss three the potential causal channels relevant in under-
standing this eﬀect: a precautionary savings channel, an exchange rate channel
and a upward pricing channel.
The precautionary savings channel refers to the contractionary eﬀects of high
uncertainty leading to paused spending and investment projects along with higher
savings by risk averse households. This drop in demand incentivises proﬁt max-
imising ﬁrms to lower their prices and is the mechanism behind the ﬁnding of
deﬂation in other studies (e.g. Leduc and Liu (2012)). It is possible that this
mechanism is very weak following an uncertainty shock in South Africa reducing
the likelihood of a deﬂationary period. Consumption drops following an uncer-
tainty shock, with a peak decline of 1% after 1.5 years (See ﬁgure 3.11). The
response of savings is weak, taking a full year before a signiﬁcant rise is seen. This
helps rationalise the timing of response of inﬂation: the inﬂationary impact occurs
in the ﬁrst year when the precautionary savings eﬀects are weaker while deﬂation
may occur at longer horizons when this eﬀect is stronger.
There remains the question of why inﬂation occurs at shorter horizons. There
is a growing body of evidence suggesting that capital ﬂight out of emerging markets
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Figure 3.11: Impulse responses to SAUI: The precautionary savings channel
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in Rands) (7) log(CPI) (8) log(All Share Index) (9) 10 Year Government Bond Yield (10) Repo Rate (11)
Uncertainty Index SAUI
is driven by global risk shocks as proxied by indices such as the VIX (Passari and
Rey (2015) and Nier et al. (2015)). If this capital ﬂight is associated with nominal
exchange rate depreciation then import prices should rise in the short term (when
the valuation eﬀect on imports dominates expenditure switching eﬀects on export
demand). Including open economy variables to measure this eﬀect, an import price
index, the balance on the ﬁnancial account (BoFA) and the nominal exchange rate
(Rands/$) does lend support to this channel. While a small depreciation follows
the uncertainty shock on impact and the inclusion of the exchange rate in the
VAR does reduce the size of the inﬂationary eﬀect to around 0.5% from 1% in the
baseline, this depreciation doesn't translate into higher import prices.
Finally the upward pricing bias channel may lead ﬁrms and wage setters to
raise prices despite a drop in demand for their goods and labour. An uncertainty
shock makes future demand more uncertainty for wage setting households and
price setting ﬁrms. The presence of nominal rigidities means that price and wage
setters can get stuck with the price they choose for many periods. It is also the case
the the pay-oﬀ for both ﬁrms and workers in setting prices is asymmetric: losses
due to a low relative price are much larger than gains from a relative price that is
too high. These incentives combine to provide an insurance value to raising prices
or wages when an uncertainty shock hits to reduce the chance that ﬁrms/workers
are stuck with a relative price/wage that is too low (when output rebounds).
The upward pricing bias channel was ﬁrst noted by Fernandez-Villaverde et al.
(2011a) for the case of price setting ﬁrms subject to Calvo nominal rigidities in
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Figure 3.12: Impulse responses to SAUI: The exchange rate channel
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the context of uncertainty shocks to capital taxes in a calibrated New Keynesian
Model. In the appendix I use a medium scale New Keynesian model to show that
the same mechanism applies for wage setting in the context of uncertainty shocks
to exogenous technology. Moreover, in this model the wage setting bias channel
is much more important in generating positive inﬂation following the technology
uncertainty shock than is the impact of price setters bias.
Despite the fact that the labour market in South Africa is very rigid with highly
active unions supporting the plausibility of this channel, it is not supported by
adding wages to the baseline VAR: wages fall following an uncertainty shock (see
ﬁgure 3.13).
Whilst none of the channels discussed above is able to explain the inﬂationary
response to uncertainty shocks an explanation may lie in the counter-cyclical be-
haviour of price mark-ups in South Africa - a fact documented by Klein (2011).
The recessionary eﬀect of the uncertainty shock in GDP/Industrial production
then translate into higher mark-ups - the timing of this decline accords with the
rise in inﬂation. Of course the real question is why does South Africa experience
counter-cyclical mark-ups. The empirical evidence presented here along with the
theoretical upward pricing channel suggests one explanation.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper develops a new index of macroeconomic uncertainty in South Africa
using (1) forecaster disagreement among professional forecasters about macroeco-
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Figure 3.13: Impulse responses to SAUI: Upward pricing bias channel
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Share Index) (8) 10 Year Government Bond Yield (9) Repo Rate (10) Uncertainty Index SAUI
nomic conditions, (2) newspaper articles about uncertainty and (3) uncertainty
from the perspective of policy makers. The impact of unanticipated increases in
uncertainty is studied using a Structural VAR. These results provide evidence that
a rise in uncertainty is important for the business cycle in South Africa, as has
been found for the U.S.A. and the U.K., with a decline in GDP, investment, in-
dustrial production and private sector employment. However, in contrast to those
developed market studies, I ﬁnd that uncertainty shocks are inﬂationary. This
eﬀect is robust to controlling for ﬁnancial stress in the form of a credit spreads,
measured by bank lending rates relative deposit rates, and consumer conﬁdence -
a proxy to disentangle the eﬀect of higher uncertainty from bad news.
These results suggest that both ﬁscal and monetary policy makers should mon-
itor the levels of economic uncertainty as this may foreshadow a decline in economic
activity. Moreover, the empirical and theoretical results show that uncertainty
shocks are particularly pernicious for inﬂation targeting central banks in that
they have stagﬂation eﬀects. Thus it may be worthwhile for South African policy
makers to survey professional forecasters as is done in the U.S.A. (Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve), U.K. (Forecasts for the
UK economy by HM Treasury) and the E.U. (Survey of Professional Forecasters
by the ECB). This would allow for a richer study of uncertainty, for example per-
ceived subjective uncertainty in the form of forecast distributions by individual
forecasters.
Future empirical research could formally explore the ability of this index to
forecast economic activity, study ﬁrm level data to test the theoretical mechanism
of precautionary pricing and develop measures of uncertainty more focused on
policy and political uncertainty.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Fixed event and ﬁxed horizon forecasts
The data contains ﬁxed event forecasts: each forecast is based on expectations
over the current calendar year as opposed to a forecast for the value of a variable
1 year ahead (a ﬁxed horizon forecast). For example, a forecast of GDP growth in
quarter 1 of 1992 and quarter 4 of 1992 are both expectations of GDP growth for
the year 199242. Since forecasts made closer to the data of the forecast year have
more information there is likely to be both less forecaster uncertainty and this
may be manifest in greater seasonality in the series for forecaster dispersion. To
address this issue I follow Dovern et al. (2012) in re-weighting the forecast data to
approximate ﬁxed horizon forecasts. Let Sfey0,q,y1(x) denote the ﬁxed event forecast
for the variable x in year y1 which is made in the previous year y0, y0 = y1− 1,
and quarter q. For example the forecast for 1992 made in quarter 1 of 1992 is
Sfe1992,1,1992(x) and forecast for 1993 made in quarter 1 of 1992 S
fe
1992,1,1993(x). The
ﬁxed horizon forecast is approximated as:
Sfhy0,q,y1(x) =
4− q + 1
4
Sfey0,q,y0(x) +
q − 1
4
Sfey0,q,y0+1(x)
For example, the forecast of GDP growth between Q4 1992 and Q4 1993 is
approximated by the sum of Sfe1992,4,1992(GDP ) and S
fe
1992,4,1993(GDP ) with weights
of 14 and
3
4 , respectively, since the ﬁrst forecast has a 1 quarter horizon for the
forecaster surveyed and the second has 3 quarter horizon. Ideally this could be
done on the raw data for each forecasters for each quarter. Unfortunately, there are
too many data gaps to pursue this approach and consequently I have to perform
this adjustment with the standard deviations across forecasters which is available
for every quarter 43. See ﬁgure 3.14 for comparision of the Dovern adjusted and
unadjusted forecaster dispersion.
42The oﬃcial data for Q4 GDP growth would only be released in Q1 1993, at the end of
February
43A signiﬁcant portion of the forecast data was recovered from archives at the National Library
of South Africa. These archives are both incomplete and require ordering a physical copy of each
newspaper where the data is expected to be found. Since it is not known which day of the month
the competition results for that month will be published, it is a challenge to ﬁnd even one table
of this data. Happily the task of recovering the standard deviations across forecasters was made
feasible by the fact that the last table of the year included this standard deviation data for all
previous months. However it does not include individual forecast data for each month.
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Figure 3.14: Fixed event and ﬁxed horizon forecasts dispersion
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3.6.2 Nowcasts vs. forecasts
Figure 3.15: GDP nowcasts vs. forecasts (+1)
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Figure 3.16: CPI nowcasts vs. forecasts (+1)
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3.6.3 Upward pricing bias channel in the medium scale New
Keynesian model of Fernandez-Villaverde (2006)
In this appendix I examine the channels driving the response of prices to an
uncertainty shock using the medium scale closed economy New Keynesian model
of Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2006). For a full description of this
model the reader is directed to those authors' paper44, here I will outline the
(completely standard) components of their model and focus on the impact of an
uncertainty shock.
Households consume (with external habit formation), save and supply diﬀeren-
tiated labour services subject to a Dixit-Stiglitz demand curve and Calvo staggered
wage setting. These labour services are purchased and aggregated by a labour-
packer ﬁrm who rents the aggregate labour input to intermediate producing ﬁrms.
. Intermediate ﬁrms rent capital (subject to variable capital utilisation and convex
adjustment costs) and labour to manufacture their good and are subject to Calvo
rigidities in setting the prices faced by the competitive ﬁnal goods producer. Mon-
etary policy operates by controlling the one-period nominal interest rate through
open market operations with government bonds held by households. The model
is calibrated at quarterly frequency following Fernandez-Villaverde (2010).
I study a shock to the volatility of exogenous technology of intermediate ﬁrms
as a proxy for an uncertainty shock, a shock to ηt:
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t
44Available here: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/~jesusfv/benchmark_DSGE.pdf
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logAt = ρa logAt−1 + σAt t
log σAt = (1− ρσ) log σA + ρσ log σAt−1 + νηt
The solution to the model is found via a third-order perturbation method using
Dynare 4.4.3. This is necessary since a ﬁrst order solution results in certainty
equivalence where an increase in the variance of a shock has no eﬀect. A second-
order solution would only include the shocks to the variance of technology as
a cross-products with the shock to the level of technology, thus the variance of
technology has no impact unless the level of technology is being changed at the
same time. Only a third-order solution allows me to study the eﬀect of a mean-
preserving increase in the variance of technology, the appropriate proxy for an
increase in uncertainty. However, higher order solutions can induce explosive
terms when the model is simulated. In order to resolve this I use the pruning
solution in Dynare which follows Andreasen et al. (2013). Pruning solves this
problem leaving out terms in the solution that have higher-order eﬀects than the
approximation order. For example, this would occur when a second order solution
to one variable is substituted into the policy function for another which is also
approximated by a quadratic function of the state variables, resulting in terms
of 3rd and 4th order. Pruning removes these terms from the solution inducing
stability.
Figure 3.17: Technology uncertainty shock (baseline calibration)
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IRFs are annualised and in percent change from the steady state.
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To study the impact of a one standard deviation increase in the volatility of
technology (ηt), I follow Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011b) in calculating the im-
pulse response functions. This involves calculating the deviation of the model from
the ergodic steady state after a one standard deviation shock to ηt. This is prefer-
able to the deviation from the deterministic steady state since the unconditional
moments of variables solved under higher-order approximations are, in general, not
equal to their steady state values since these solutions include non-linear terms
that correct for uncertainty (see Andreasen et al. (2013)). The computation pro-
ceeds as follows. I simulate the model with all shocks set to zero for 2048 periods
starting at the deterministic steady state. I take the ergodic mean as the value
each variable has converged to after 2000 iterations. I then use the last 48 periods
to ﬁnd the response with the volatility shock by setting the volatility shock (ηt) to
one standard deviation and simulating the for 48 periods, starting at the ergodic
means. The impulse responses are reported as the deviations from the ergodic
mean of each variable.
Figure 3.18: Inﬂation response to technology uncertainty shock
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IRFs are annualised and in percent change from the steady state. The proportion of labour suppliers who
can reset their wage each period is 1−θwages. I assume a level of θprices = 0.4 (baseline is θprices = 0.8).
The results from this baseline calibration accord well with the VAR results
presented in the main section (see ﬁgure 3.17). This model then provides an
environment to understand why inﬂation follows an uncertainty shock. In this
closed economy environment the precautionary savings channel acts to reduce
prices whilst the upward pricing bias channel acts to raise them. Thus it should
be the case that when prices and wages are more ﬂexible inﬂation should fall
following an uncertainty shock. Moreover, the importance of ﬁrms' upward pricing
bias relative to that of labour suppliers can be studied. I examine these channels
by increasing the proportion of ﬁrms that can reset prices from the baseline of
20% to 60% and consider the response of inﬂation when the proportion of labour
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suppliers able to reset their wage moves from the baseline of 32% towards 100%
(ﬂexible wages) - see ﬁgure 3.18. When prices are more ﬂexible and wages are
fairly ﬂexible (100% to 85% of labour suppliers can reset wages each period) the
precautionary savings motive dominates upward pricing bias eﬀects. For higher
levels of nominal rigidities in wage setting, where 70% or less of labour suppliers
can reset wages each period, uncertainty shocks are inﬂationary. Thus, in the
standard macroeconomic model used by central banks, the key rigidity generating
an inﬂationary response to uncertainty shocks in the strength of nominal wage
rigidity.
As described in the main text, the upward pricing bias is due to two features of
the model, ﬁrstly, workers are subject to nominal rigidities and thus may be unable
to change their wages for a number of periods; secondly, the pay-oﬀ they face
in choosing the relative wage strongly biased towards avoiding states with a low
relative wage (see ﬁgure 3.19). This leads workers to raise wages as a precautionary
measure when future demand for their labour becomes more uncertain.
Figure 3.19: Utility pay-oﬀ of jth household choosing wj : α
(wj
w
)1−η −
β
(wj
w
)−η(1+γ)
wj/w is the relative price of the jth household. , η is the elasticity of substitution between labour types
and γ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. η = 10,γ = 1 are the baseline values.α, β
are functions of steady state parameters. α = λwld where λ is the marginal utility of wealth and ld is
the aggregate demand for labour. β = (ld)1+γ/1 + γ.
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3.6.4 Robustness checks: Impulse response functions
Figure 3.20: IRFs: Baseline + Conﬁdence Index + Credit Spread
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Figure 3.21: IRFs: Short Sample: 1996-2013Q4
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Figure 3.22: IRFs: Baseline + VIX
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Figure 3.23: IRFs: Sign restrictions
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